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As a small-island developing state, Haiti’s extreme physical vulnerability is further compounded 
by current political and civil society conditions that further weaken its ability to anticipate and plan for 
future disaster events. In the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, the 
nation’s core, discourse has increasingly recognized the physical and structural concentration of power as 
problematic. These critiques of the Haitian state have pointed towards a need for decentralization and 
autonomy from interceding foreign entities in order for Haiti to successfully plan for risk reduction and 
decrease its vulnerability to future disaster events. I will refer to this process as adaptation planning and 
through this paper will examine the role of recent innovations in Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) in augmenting the adaptive capacity of the Haitian state to carry out these processes. 
As a critical subset of this, the role of the state in regulating intellectual property regimes to support 
intellectual capital will also be examined. This is necessary to promote the development of suitable and 
adaptable ICTs, which require specific institutional conditions that support domestic innovation and 
application development. 
New ICTs that emerged in the humanitarian response to the 2010 earthquake, particularly mobile-
based technologies, have been hyped for their ability to spatialize and organize disaster relief efforts and 
more broadly, to assist short-term mitigation efforts. The international community has also speculated 
about their ability to identify community need, and facilitate participation and information sharing 
amongst authorities, enhancing state efficiencies and paving the way towards social and physical 
resiliency. It becomes critical to assess the true utility of these technologies by understanding whether 
they can be adapted to idiosyncratic behaviors, innovation processes, and long-term uses or whether they 
will be phased out. If these platforms are to be adapted to more long-term needs and uses, a question of 
management and operation emerges; as implementing bodies and resources begin to filter out, who will 
continue the operation of complex new ICTs and adapt these platforms as need evolves? More 




more robust understanding of the potentials and limitations of crowd-sourced and mobile ICTs for 
building adaptive capabilities and enhancing state functions in Haiti.  
By analyzing communication workflows of three different mobile and open source platforms, 
Noula, SIS-KLOR, and OpenStreetmap, this study seeks to elucidate whether new information and 
communication technologies are a viable medium for enhancing the adaptive capacity of the Haitian state 
and to what extent they have been institutionalized and/or adapted to address long-term planning needs. I 
will assert that crowd-sourced and new information and communication technologies are too complex to 
be properly managed and/or developed by state entities.  Local and regional agencies lack resources and 
capacity to process and compute information, while information is too localized for national level 
agencies to understand and accurately interpret. Even if state agencies were equipped with the necessary 
resources to manage platforms, I will argue that accessibility and path dependency issues prevent ICTs 
from accurately representing diversity since vast inequalities in accessibility exist between urban and 
rural populations as well as generationally. Were this to replace traditional means of communication and 
participation, this could lead to an undemocratic process that excludes those without the fiscal and 
technical means to communicate via technology. Since I place emphasis on the ability of Haitians to adapt 
these technologies to local need, this requires technical capacities and resources to innovate, develop, and 
manage new platforms domestically. For this reason, I also intend to investigate the role of the state in 







The January 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince, or the Goudougoudou, was a natural event but 
“the scale of the destruction was due to the massive failure of Haitian social institutions, namely the state, 
and international policy, which predated the earthquake” (Gros, 2011;133). As an island state with a 
tumultuous political economy, as well as disaster-prone environmental factors, Haiti has been consistently 
considered one of the most vulnerable developing states, particularly in the Western hemisphere. Global 
forces have created a state of dependency in Haiti with thousands of foreign organizations ranging from 
multinational corporations to small-scale NGO’s superseding in developmental affairs. Foreign actors, 
oftentimes with dual agendas (inter-organization and funder-imposed), have been criticized for failing to 
address local needs and for exasperating the already frail state of national, regional, and local level 
governments by absorbing its human capital. Arguments have been made for the importance of increased 
political autonomy to coordinate development efforts and align projects with local needs to decrease 
Haiti’s disaster risk. As evident from the 2010 earthquake, the coping mechanisms currently in place are 
inadequate and would not be able to sustain a repeat disaster. Building adaptive capacity therefore 
presents itself as a pressing issue to build resiliency. 
The traditional humanitarian response1 system faced significant challenges in Haiti given the lack 
of spatial information with which to organize the relief effort and parcel out areas of control, additionally 
there were no communication links between the response system and the disaster-affected communities. 
While prior disaster responses in Haiti have relied heavily on the leveraging of radio to distribute vital 
information, in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, all radio towers with the exception of one were in 
states of disrepair (Nelson & Sigal, 2011). Disaster affected-communities communicated with each other 
via telejol (word of mouth) and cell phones to try to locate family members, resources, etc. (Chery & 
                                            
1 The traditional humanitarian response is organized around the cluster system, in which a designated international organization 
will assume responsibility of a specific sector (water & sanitation, education, etc.). Teams are then further subdivided, 




Wall, 2011). However, responders were unable to tap into this network due to language barriers and 
insufficient knowledge – this resulted in a very chaotic and disorganized response. According to one 
platform developer, who observed from his experience working with disaster affected communities and 
the humanitarian responders that “the public services and NGOs were more chaotic and disorganized than 
the small neighborhood associations [that were managing themselves]” (Jean-Charles, 2012).  Since there 
was no means through which to distribute vital information, and no means for effectuating dialogue 
between responders and survivors, this led to the emergence of new forms of outreach to disaster-affected 
communities such as crowd-sourcing through mobile devices. Once radio stations began to resurface, 
combinations between the two media – or “mash-ups” - were leveraged to reach a broader range of 
citizens. These mash-ups were found to solicit two-way flows of communication so that responders could 
not only relay information to earthquake survivors but also receive information from the very 
communities they were attempting to assist. Examples of these are OpenStreetMap, Noula, and Ushahidi. 
The international community has recognized such tools as agents for informing and coordinating 
emergency relief groups, as well as venues for catalyzing development through identification of 
community needs by the community itself. Further more, they can begin to address the issue of lack of 
available information - particularly geospatial information - since many of Haiti’s archives were lost or 
destroyed in the disaster. Recent innovations not only offer the opportunity to reproduce this information 
but also to provide social protections to the general population and act as citizen communication 
platforms. New platforms allow SMS information to be geo-referenced and mapped or automatically 
entered into a database which can be made publicly available and accessed at no cost by individuals, local 
institutions, the central government, or international organizations. For instance Ushahidi, a crowdsourced 
ICT mapping platform, received 80,000 SMS texts from individual mobile device users in the aftermath 
of the 2010 earthquake, messages were translated, geo-located, prioritized and then relayed to emergency 
responders which greatly facilitated the aid delivery process and coordinated relief efforts amongst 
disparate organizations. (Nelson & Sigal, 2011) Noula, a Haitian equivalent to NYC’s ‘311’ or the “gate 




more coordinated manor given open information flows. In the aftermath of crises, this spatial overlay also 
helps researchers to understand the causes and implications of such events. Such technologies can 
augment the capacities of the Haitian state to create spatial information, manage information, coordinate 
different activities and respond more adequately in emergency situations.  
Large-scale investments that have taken place in the ICT sector for infrastructure improvements 
have granted access to a larger proportion of Haiti’s population to exchange information instantly, 
highlighting the potential of these new platforms to facilitate information sharing amongst planning 
agencies in Haiti. Since many humanitarian responders have reacted by building their own private 
information databases, an uncoordinated approach has developed in which vertical information silos are 
created amongst both public and private entities. This severely limits access to information and 
contributes to duplication of efforts, and can be widely observed in Haiti amongst different governmental 
bureaus and NGOs. Use of such proprietary systems requires specialized training to access information, 
creating barriers to information and data sharing and limiting the abilities of state entities to make 
adaptations to the software. A dependency on external information sources or technical support has 
resulted. Newly developed platforms using Opensource Software (OSS) circumvent these issues by 
allowing for greater interoperability between systems and formats, increasing the ability to share data and 
communicate. OSS licensing also allows the source codes of the software to be available for public 
display, meaning amateur developers can build off of the source code, allowing for increased adaptations 
and derivations of existing technologies. 
Shifting focus towards long-term sustainability, as governmental bureaus and firms begin to 
modernize their communications and data management, it becomes critical plan for this emerging market. 
The rapid technological change that has taken place in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake provides the 
opportunity to bolster Haiti’s technology and information markets, allowing it to compete in the global 
knowledge-based economy. However, current institutional frameworks are impeding upon innovation 
processes amongst Haiti’s technology community. The Government of Haiti (GOH) has engaged in 




imitating foreign software’s, while domestic IP policy has lagged far behind the technological change 
discouraging local innovations. This concept will be further discussed in the   
Failed States 
“Haiti has become a failed state” (Schwartz, 2010). This has become a recurrent theme in most of 
the literature surrounding Haitian politics, both pre and post-earthquake era. In Schwartz’s case, he posits 
this commonly perceived ‘fact’ to “fraud, greed, corruption, and political agendas that permeate the 
industry of foreign aid” and of, “disastrous effects of economic engineering by foreign governments and 
international aid organizations.” (Schwartz, 2010). Although the scale of the January 2010 earthquake 
was quite large by international standards, the loss and damage triggered by the event was extremely 
disproportionate when compared to events of similar scale in different locales. Disasters pose significant 
challenges and threats to nation-states of any capacity - weaknesses in the US Government response to 
Hurricane Katrina were exposed in the aftermath of the event – but Haiti’s latest disaster was magnified 
by the “pathologies of Haitian politics” and failed state which could not adequately respond to the event 
(Gros 2011;134). Haiti lost the majority of its personnel in the span of one business day, this dramatic and 
sudden loss of human agency has exasperated its already debilitated conditions. In addition to loss of 
human resources, Haiti lost the majority of its information archives – most of these being paper based and 
thus lost in the disaster. Because of this, in order to really understand in what capacity the state was 
functioning, serving its constituents, and responding to natural hazards, it is more valuable to look at 
governance in pre-earthquake Haiti. As Bilgin sums up this approach, “by historicizing various 
representations of ‘failed states’ it becomes possible to open up critical ways of thinking about the 
political economy of security and to consider alternative futures in world order” (Bilgin, 2002:55). 
Foreign developmental practice has pervaded Haitian planning institutions; intervening 
organizations with inherent “self-organizing” and “self-evaluating” structures make the coordination and 
monitoring of these disparate groups extremely complicated (Schwartz, 2008). Moreover, scholars seem 




undermined Haitian governmental capacity through competition for human capital and resources with 
NGOs. This in effect has also limited its ability to oversee and manage these external forces (Pierre-
Louis, 2011). The result has been a gaping void in terms of oversight and the erosion of the Keynesian 
social welfare state, leaving foreign intervention to fill the void.  
What has been more heavily contested is how this state of dependency came to exist; some 
attribute the increased involvement of the global sector in state activities as a result of internationally 
perceived governmental corruption and dysfunction. Historical critiques have been centered on cultural 
practices and governance structures inherited from colonizing powers, resulting in authoritarian regimes 
and an elite class that have perpetuated patterns of inequality and oppression (Fatton, 2011). A slightly 
more nuanced version of this blames racism and cultural biases of the West and exploitative tendencies of 
Capitalism (Bellegarde-Smith). Isolating the Haitian state from the international realm, it becomes 
evident that internal politics of uncertainty play at least some role in the debility of the state. According to 
Jean-Germain Gros, the unwillingness of national Haitian leaders to devolve power stems from the fear of 
losing control in the process leading them to allocate services only as far as they can personally monitor. 
Severe fiscal restraints also limit public investment to where short-term returns will be the highest and 
where the most powerful constituencies are located, i.e. Port-au-Prince (Gros 2011;137-39). Inequities in 
distribution of resources between the epicenter of the country and the rest of the “country” have been the 
outcome. 
Perhaps a combination of the aforementioned causalities of the dependent state, it is clear that 
perceptions of political corruption have resulted in foreign donors circumventing the state to deliver aid, 
one can observe a shift of decision-making power “up” to international aid organizations and “down” 
NGO’s as a direct result of neoliberal globalization, resulting in a problematic “privatization” of service 
delivery (Schuller, 2009). These critiques articulate a nation where development is occurring haphazardly 
and externally to any comprehensive plan directed towards a particular vision. Disjointed development 
coupled with governmental inability to set parameters or coping mechanisms in place leads us to the 




absence of any organization of the state that can quickly mobilize human and technical resources” (Gros 
2011;. 149). 
Adaptation Planning 
 In order to reduce vulnerability to recurring climate events, adaptation planning should be 
recognized as a necessary function of the state. According to one source, “adaptation means actions 
targeted at the vulnerable system in response to actual or expected climate stimuli with the objective of 
moderating harm from climate change or exploiting opportunities” (McCarthy, 2001). Here, vulnerability 
will be defined as human risk exposure to environmental hazard. It is important to understand 
vulnerability not just as a condition of the environment but of “socio-ecologies”, or complex interactions 
of environmental and human systems (Beately, 2009). As a result of weak political and unstable 
economic systems that have led to extreme environmental degradation and poverty, Haiti has been 
identified as the most vulnerable SIDS. These conditions have further weakened its ability - at both the 
individual and collective levels - to recover from repeat shocks (Pelling and Uitto, 2011).  
For SIDS such as Haiti, vulnerability reduction then becomes a key theme that can be categorized 
into three closely correlated concepts: resiliency, hazard mitigation, and sustainability. While mitigation 
has commonly been interpreted as physical intervention to reduce vulnerability to crises, resilience tends 
to emphasize the broader social systems and processes for facilitating response and recovery. These terms 
differ in resiliency’s implicit “focus on creative adaptation and learning and its focus on developing an 
underlying capacity” (Beatley, 2009: 6). Thus, the scope of this research intends to contribute towards an 
understanding of “adaptive capacity” building in Haiti, specifically for regions outside Port-au-Prince. 
Qualities of resilient communities vary, but such communities can broadly be recognized for their 
ability to continue providing goods and services that support quality of life while retaining basic structure, 
functions, and identity after being subjected to a variety of shocks (Walker and Salt, 2004). It then 
becomes important to ensure both the individual and the collective with faculty to reorganize at a local 




supporting these functions. These strategies help build trust, enable learning, and assist the individual in 
the preparation and response to crises (Pelling, 2001; Beately, 2009). Drawing from Haiti-specific 
literature on the present day developmental landscape, it seems appropriate to advocate for an increased 
role of local government in organizing and coordinating future relief efforts as well as for steering long-
term planning. 
 
Decentralization and Participation 
Another critique of the Haitian state centers around decentralization, here I will advocate that 
increasing citizen participation in planning processes is a necessary accompaniment to decentralization. 
After the departure of the authoritarian Duvalier regime from power in 1986, a “new”, modernized 
Republic was formed and translated into the constitution of 1987. According to article 87.4, 
“Decentralization must be accompanied by the decentralization of services and by industrial 
departmentalization to the benefice of the departments” (Élie, 2009). Although the constitution sets the 
framework for autonomous local governances, applications of such decentralization have proven 
unsuccessful. Politics of uncertainty still plague the ruling elite class, as such, rulers tend to “personalize 
state power” which limits essential state services and assets to the primate city, drawing people from the 
hinterland to the city for basic services (Gross, 2011). These Haitian phenomena can help us understand 
the conditions in Haiti that led to such widespread destruction at the onset and in the aftermath of the 
January 2010 earthquake. Decentralization and participation are inexorably linked since localities could 
greatly increase leverage with national governmental agencies through identification and community 
needs and hard data, information that can be generated through avenues of public participation.  
As Jane Jacobs puts it, “cities have the capability of providing something for everybody, only 
because, and only when, they are created by everybody” (Jacobs, 1961). The introduction of this idea - 
incorporating the disenfranchised individual into developmental processes to better serve the city in its 




many different forms over the past couple decades, it fundamentally advocates a restructuring of political 
space and an increased importance placed on the “local” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000).  The idea of 
rescaling political power and decision making to a more localized level is an inevitable structural 
adjustment needed in Haiti. This however, can also be accompanied by major challenges and problems, 
such as lack of technical capacity to handle decision making at the local level and a downplaying of 
hegemonic politics at the local level. In the context of Haiti, which is already decentralized in terms of its 
development agencies but not in terms of political power, a more liberal interpretation of decentralization 
is required: one that recognizes a need for less reliance on external agents possessing normative biases to 
achieve locally determined change by the self and/or community for the self and/or community (Mohan 
and Stoke, 2000).   
Albert Hirschman argues that consumers and members of private organizations drive recovery 
from lapses in performance, or “slack”, by choosing between two distinct mechanisms: exit and voice. 
The voice option allows dissatisfied individuals to express opinions to invoke reform, while dissatisfied 
individuals who take the exit route simply leave the organization. Respectively, these mechanisms are 
political and economic reactions to slack (Hirschman, 1970). Applying Hirschman’s ideas to the state, as 
an entity that also provides services to its members, or “constituents”, one observes the need for both 
mechanisms in place to minimize slack and allow for constant recuperation. Given the frequent political 
instability and perceived “rigged” elections, one can denote that Haitians have not had consistent access 
to the voice option. Thusly, those with adequate resources have resorted to the exit option; effectively 
leaving the country for other countries that offer more/better services and opportunities for advancement. 
This trend has contributed to the “brain drain” phenomenon that has had profound ramifications on 
human capital in Haiti. Along the same ideology as Hirschman, Kenneth Arrow has noted that “when the 
market fails to achieve an optimal state, society will, to some extent at least, recognize the gap, and 
nonmarket social institutions will arise attempting to bridge it” (Arrow, 1963:53). Haitians without either 
voice or exit options have remained powerless, while civil society (NGOs and international organizations) 




information to organizations, communicating feedback that offers solutions for improvement and change. 
My critique asserts that Haitian citizens, as constituents of the Haitian state, should be endowed with 
voice to effectively respond to the failure of the state. 
Information Communications Technology (ICT) 
  Web 2.0 enables the “crowd”, or the collective, to communicate volunteered information about 
needs, opinions, and/or location to a “cloud”, a crowd, or an individual. The Web 2.0 phenomenon is 
often referred to as crowd sourcing, but peer production and cloud collaboration are other common 
terminologies (Zook et al., 2010:13). In countries with limited internet access, users of Web 2.0 
communicate this information primarily through SMS messaging with mobile or cellular devices. This 
increased availability of information and spatial data has revolutionized the production of geographic 
information, which previously was restricted to professional cartographers. Applications of crowd-
sourced information are constantly expanding beyond geospatial data production as new socio-
technologic interfaces are configured.2 
 Innovations in ICT emerged during the humanitarian response to the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-
Prince. Since geographic data can be produced more efficiently using these technologies, the limited 
technical resources were available for more imperative aid-delivery functions rather than for information 
production. SMS-based applications allow for new innovative processes of monitoring and data 
collection, changing the way decision makers approach service delivery (Berg & Modi). Perhaps more 
critical to the aid delivery process was the individual’s ability to instantly report local conditions via SMS 
texting. Mobile devices provide citizens with an opportunity to express opinions and needs, effectively 
providing them with voice and increasing the potential to reincorporate the disenfranchised individual 
into the decision-making and planning process, filling crucial connectivity gaps. New technology 
platforms have acted as venues for communities to demand services, which has played a critical role for 
                                            
2 Current categories of recent and mobile ICT interfaces include: mapping, medical/health, governance, business/finance, water, 





disaster response coordination and delivery of aid (Shklovski et al, 2008). International actors have 
recognized the potential of such venues to inform long-term reconstruction planning processes and to act 
as facilitators of improvements in the quality of municipal level work and services. 
A paper from Aalborg University coins the term “e-planning” as opposed to e-governance, which 
encompasses the use of ICT by local governments as a way to involve the community in a more efficient 
manner (Larsen, 2003). To avoid problematic interpretations of community participation, it is necessary 
to clarify the community in question as well as the degree of participation and power consigned to said 
community. Because this study analyzes the flows of communication that collapse space and time, 
participation will be defined as the empowerment of the individual citizen with voice. Within Arnstein’s 
ladder, a theoretical model ranking the varying degrees of public participation, this falls onto the 
‘informing’ rung (Union, 2005). 
Given the current process, wherein local municipalities assess community need and relay this 
information to the departmental (regional) level where development projects are supposedly 
implemented, the SMS presents a unique opportunity to fill this void in capacity and resources. The 
incorporation of ICT into local, and potentially regional, planning practices has the capacity to allow for 
better coping mechanisms and thusly, decreased threats from future mega-events. A 2010 Master’s thesis 
from LSE Cities Program entitled, “Crowd-Sourced Port-au-Prince? The possibility of SMS messaging in 
Re-building Haiti’s Capital” proposes a theoretical model for using crowd-sourced mediums for 
redesigning the capital city in a more democratic process, incorporating critical input of the community 
(White A. , 2010). 
However, these optimistic hopes for crowd-sourced technologies to empower disenfranchised 
groups are not without problematic assumptions. There remains a gap between the aforementioned 
conceived possibilities of ICT and its actual implementation. Most notably is the inability to authenticate 
and manage information, with no system in place to validate incoming data, one is forced to rely on the 
assumption that additional information communicated will correct the errors of invalid information, 




generated from these technologies, because data was sourced from the crowd, it may have no bearing in 
local or regional, and certainly not national, decision making. Devaluation of crowd-sourced data may 
prevent its incorporation in decision making beyond emergency situations.  
Additionally, there exist inequalities in knowledge and access to ICT, such as generational skills 
and rural disadvantage, which could result in small homogeneous groups representing a supposed “broad 
collective”. Because younger generations are more adept at using newer technologies and adapting to 
innovations within them, this suggests that younger populations participate more in these processes and 
thus relying on these technologies as a means to generate public participation would exclude older 
generations. Even though it is assumed by the international community that mobile devices are 
ubiquitous, as of 2010, 3.5 million Haitians owned a cell phone, representing only 35% of the Haitian 
population (Boute, 2010). Barriers to access in technologies challenge the assumption that crowd-sourced 
technologies have a greater capacity to address diversity within communities.  
Aggregates of information also prevent accurate and fair representation. Information 
communicated to a receiving platform is interpreted and prioritized, this subjects information to 
interpretative biases and if there are multiple operators, lack of standardization. For instance, a particular 
group of citizens could organize and text information about an issue within a community, while an 
individual who sends an SMS about a more imminent issue will be prioritized behind the group who is 
advocating for a more mundane and less pressing issue. Although this can happen with person-to-person 
participation, it is more difficult to understand the situation when the interpreter is not positioned on the 
ground (White A. , 2011). This would necessitate that localities be the managers of this data, however, 
local governments might not possess the technical or human faculty for processing and managing this 
data. 
Additionally, current configurations of crowd-sourced technologies only allow for one-way flows 
of information, meaning data is communicated but often not responded to. Without closed-circuits of 




question whether or not community input is actually utilized or incorporated within the decision making 
process. A new model would need to be developed to allow for a built-in accountability apparatus.  
Although these technologies might have proved effective during the emergency relief process, it 
remains unknown whether these technologies can be harnessed and incorporated into a rebuilding and 
resiliency planning process led by Haitian public organizations. These technologies might perhaps be too 
complex to be centrally managed and don’t truly engage citizen participation.  
Technological Innovation and Emerging Economies 
 In the past, technological advancement, which intrinsically accompanies the process of 
industrialization, has been recognized for its economic development potential since modernization of 
technologies is closely tied with increased efficiencies in resource production. Innovations are drivers of 
technological change and can be typically classified in five ways: new products, new methods of 
production or processes, creation of new markets, new sources of supply, or new organization of 
competitive structure (Schumpeter, 1938). Technological innovations, though commonly linked with 
increased market efficiency, can also provide social protections if promoted through public policy 
(Srinivas S. , 2011). Adapting policies to technological change thus becomes critical in order to ensure 
that social protections coincide with innovation and economic expansion. Failure to do so may lead to 
income inequality, social stratification, or urban crowding since urbanization issues are closely related to 
technological choices, which often affect sectoral development and employment in rural versus urban 
areas (Eckhaus, 1977). Ensuring that policy is current with technological change is critical for 
maximizing social benefits from this advancement since there is often significant lag time.  
As Srinivas and Sutz discuss, the dominance of innovations originating in industrialized countries 
are perceived to have certain universal characteristics and are associated with input resources that are 
available in abundance contexts. In this sense, globalization and international markets have contributed to 
the homogenization of technology; introducing new technologies that are not always appropriate for a 




Sutz, 2008).  Since late-industrializing countries operate in scarcity conditions with insufficient resources 
to replicate goods or technologies in ways that advanced industrialized countries are able to, this leads to 
innovations in both process and design when attempting to overcome these scarcities: 
“Any process of development must be supported by local strengths in knowledge and 
innovation…. to put [capacity to innovate in scarcity conditions] to work, the productive and 
social demands that need idiosyncratic approaches must be detected and translated into innovative 
terms: this is something that will hardly occur without purposeful actions, that is, a set of quite 
precise and focused innovation policies.” (137). 
 
Current institutional organization in Haiti has resulted in parties from advanced industrialized 
economies introducing technologies that are created with inputs and resources available in “abundant 
ambiances” into an environment of scarcity.   
With this framework, one must denote the fundamental differences between technologies that 
‘increase resource productivity’ and information and communication technologies (ICTs), which do not 
directly result in an increased capacity to create physical outputs but do affect the social modernization, 
and flows of information, which impact political processes. ICTs have accelerated the development of the 
intellectual capital market, one in which a knowledge-based global economy has emerged. It is important 
also to differentiate between social innovation – those which are derived and born out of some social need 
– and business innovations – those created primarily for generating profit (Mulgan, 2006). While many 
social innovations lack the financial models needed to be self-sustained, which prevents the private sector 
from operating and scaling such services, the public sector holds potential for operating and scaling such 
innovations. For the purpose of this study, both types of innovations will be examined. However, to more 
narrowly define the scope of this study, innovations in information and communication technology (ICT) 
that contribute to the generation of information that possesses utility to the Government of Haiti (GOH) 
will be examined. Since a confluence of new ICTs has surfaced in Haiti since the January 2010 event, one 
could focus on any specific sector: ICT for agriculture, mobile banking, mobile health, etc. Case studies 
featured in this research will examine innovations in ICT that generate geo-spatial information, a basic 




Open Source Software (OSS) 
Open-source software (OSS) are non-proprietary technology platforms which can include 
operating systems, PC hardware, game consoles, etc; these platforms are used for running various 
complementary applications typically provided by other competitive firms (Economides & Katsamakas, 
2006).  As a fundamental and assumed subset of new mobile ICT applications, OSS will also be assessed 
in this study since OSS have also been hyped for their ability to create derivative applications and 
promote innovation by lowering barriers to entry. OSS are considered to be information - or knowledge - 
goods that eliminate access costs and fees to both end-users and complementary competitive firms. In 
effect, because the cost of reproducing an already existing work is very low, additional agents may be 
introduced at near zero cost, lending to a larger variety of applications. Economides and Katsamakas 
imply that the zero price feature lends to a higher adoption rate and an increased willingness to pay for 
complementary applications, which results in a larger number of applications. Additionally they found 
that in a context where users prefer a larger variety of applications and when demand for the application is 
stronger than that of the platform, that open source industry will be more profitable than that of the whole 
proprietary industry (2006). This lends to the creation of additional works that build upon previous works, 
ultimately lending to a greater social benefit and greater variety. Another work shows how monopolies 
weaken incentives for independent innovation in integrated market systems3 by extracting rents from 
independent suppliers (Farrell & Katz, 2000). Von Hippel asserts that open source platforms are 
contributing towards the democratization of innovation, ultimately allowing both users of platforms to 
innovate for themselves and circumventing the dependence on manufacturers who function as agents that 
deliver imperfect goods (von Hippel, 2005).  
Although existing literature examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) and 
proprietary software’s impact on innovation, the question of proprietary versus open source platforms in 
industrializing countries is under-researched. Camara and Fonseca state that open systems will allow 
                                            
3 Integrated market systems are systems where the final good is a combination of two complementary goods, one which is 




developing countries to adapt foreign technology to local conditions and will help embed indigenous 
knowledge in foreign technologies, helping to span between the two. Here, they advocate for policies that 
facilitate the emergence of technological innovations with low potential of reverse engineering but high 
potential for distributed development4 through public investment in human capital (Camara & Fonseca, 
2007). This work also cites the academic community as a vital component of open source 
contributions/production and thus, innovation. A working paper by Kogut and Metiu recognizes 
information as a public good5 that can be distributed more effectively to developing countries through 
OSS, allowing for broader geographic participation in frontier innovation and avoidance of inefficiencies 
in IPR regimes (Kogut & Metiu, 2001). 
However, because there are no intellectual property protections associated with open source 
software to exclude competitors and control rent, this has been argued to result in a loss of productivity 
for society with no incentive to create new goods. This might be true in advanced industrialized countries 
with strong states and enforcement capabilities, but is less so in industrializing countries with weak or 
failed states and no intellectual property protection regimes. Operating under open source licenses 
actually offers many advantages to overcome this obstacle, enforcing excludability and preventing free 
riding and theft. Through this means, many firms bundle immaterial goods with material goods, 
essentially commodifying intellectual property (Granstrand, 2000). 
One study has concluded that innovations would continue to appear in the absence of patent 
protection and that in general, patents were not sufficient to appropriate or capture all benefits from 
innovation (Granstand, 2005). Economides and Katsamakas assert that “proprietary applications of an 
industry based on an open source platform may be more profitable than the total profits of a proprietary 
platform industry” leading to increased variety of applications with open source platforms (Economides 
& Katsamakas, 2006). This is an important point, this paper willl argue that the incentives and driving 
                                            
4 Camara and Fonseca define innovations with low shared conceptualization and high modularity as those that are not easily 
replicated through reverse engineering and which have higher potential for distributed development. These usually take place in 
academic spaces or through collaborations of software engineer networks (2007). 




force of innovation for new information and technology platforms in Haiti was for the creation of social 
goods, even amongst the private sector. It will also be argued that open source software lends to a greater 
social good especially in industrializing countries where resources are scarce, thus barriers to access 
goods are high which restricts innovation and modifications to existing technologies. I will also assert that 
open source technology platforms encourage innovation by decreasing the risk of investment (high up-
front costs, free riding, and low excludability) and through enabling free access to source code from 
which individuals or organizations are able to create new derivations.  
DESIGN 
The broad issue herein discussed has dealt with the connections between recent innovations in 
ICT, and adaptive capacity building within the context of Haiti. In order to effectively respond to my 
prompt question, I find it vital to understand the efficacies and limitations of different applications of new 
SMS-based ICTs before I can assess the feasibility for incorporating these technologies into the 
governmental framework. Although I initially intended to locate my study area in province (i.e. outside of 
Port au Prince) in light of the emphasis placed on decentralization, after conducting an initial site visit, I 
found these technologies to be irrelevant in such areas. This led me to focus on technologies being 
leveraged in Port au Prince, which is a strong indicator that they are primarily being used for 
reconstruction and relief efforts.  
Phase 1. Inventory of Actors and ICT Usage 
1.1 Inventory: Baseline conditions 
In order to acquire an accurate understanding of the landscape on the ground, I mapped the different 
developmental agencies at work in Haiti in the ICT sector. To accomplish this, I began by taking an 
inventory of actors, and identified whether or not crowd-sourced technologies or data was utilized in each 
actors planning processes or was encouraged through their programs. If the former, I denoted the venue 




provided me with a launching point from which I then selected key cases of ICT usage to critically 
analyze.  
1.2 Document Review 
 
I explored various budgets and plans to quantify how innovations and information and communication 
technologies are being encouraged in Haiti and to better understand the policy framework behind the use 
of these technologies. This includes a review of relevant legislation on intellectual property rights (IPR), 
which will be necessary to provide a context for my understanding of institutional uptake of technologies. 
I also conducted a periodical review to inform my understanding of infrastructure development projects, 
and more recent innovations in ICT. To better comprehend the relationship between international 
intellectual property (IP) related agreements, domestic IP related agreements, and domestic innovation, I 
also ran rudimentary regressions to graph the relationship between these factors.  
1.3 Mapping: Democratic or informative? 
As an intermediary between this phase of research and the subsequent “critical analysis” phase, I also 
diagrammatically mapped information flows from ICT end-users through individual crowd-sourced data 
platforms (i.e. Ushahidi, Noula, OSM) over snap shots of time to understand evolution and adaptations of 
technology systems compounded with information flows of responding actors. This also helped me to 
understand how many applications have developed surrounding each platform. With this information I 
was able to draw conclusions about software nature (OSS vs. proprietary) and foreign vs. locally derived 
innovations. This analysis of communication flows allowed me to determine which platforms had the 
greatest amount of derivation applications, which had the most amount of uptake by state bodies and local 
or foreign actors, and whether the platforms were primarily one-way - indicating “informative 
participation” - or whether they were closed flows - indicating democratic participation in which there 




1.3 Interviews: Biased Interpretation? 
I also interviewed various ICT platform operators that have been involved in Haiti (Ushahidi, Noula, etc.) 
to understand their interpretation and prioritization processes and how they perceive their role in disaster 
response, long-term planning, and facilitating community participation.  Ultimately this allowed me 
assess whether there is bias in the way information is interpreted and prioritized. Since I am also focusing 
on mobile communication technologies, I found it relevant to conduct interviews with large-scale Haitian 
cellular providers (i.e. Digicel and Voila) since reception coverage is an integral component of 
communicating information, this helped to questions concerning accessibility. A further in-depth analysis 
of intra-organizational adaptation to innovations in ICT occurs in the next phase. 
*See Appendix B for sample interview questions 
Phase II. Critical Analysis of Crowd-Source Technology 
2.1 Interviews: Agency Analysis 
This was the most critical phase of my research. I assessed whether new ICTs are effective at 
addressing the fundamental issues herein outlined, and whether they realize the perceived benefits. My 
institutional landscape map helped me to determine which actors are engaging in mobile SMS-based 
information production. From my inventory I selected three key cases that have engaged ICTs as a 
primary strategy to study at a deeper level. To triangulate my findings, the three case studies were 
selected to represent all sectors (public, private, and civil society). From here I conducted interviews with 
key stakeholders. Within each agency, I interviewed members and decision-makers to understand the 
software used, the innovation processes, technological evolution and outcomes and their associated 
perceptions. Although I had initially planned to survey beneficiaries to garner feedback, logistical 
constraints prevented this, in its stead; reports from the Red Cross and Internews were used to understand 
community reactions. 




Phase III. Planning Institution Response to Innovation 
3.1 Interviews: Organizational Adaptation  
During this portion, I engaged in a study of planning institutions in Haiti to understand how 
methodologies have changed to respond to and incorporate new data. I internally evaluated the role that 
ICT plays in informing agency activities and plans and how institutions have been reconfigured in 
response. This step was necessary to grasp the value that agencies assign to new technologies and if they 
are able to change, reorganize or restructure based on input received from the masses. This helped answer 
the question of whether ICTs can really be viable means to enhance institutional capacity, and if not, 
which impediments to this ideal could be uncovered. This required a series of interviews with 
representatives regional governmental bureaus such as FAES, Regional Ministry of Planning, DINEPA 
and community-based organization, as well as local governmental representatives (mayors and CASEC 
members). One national representative was also interviewed. Through this segment, I sought to 
understand how many resources were consumed during the conversion process to gauge the feasibility of 
incorporating new ICT into governmental planning processes.  
*See appendix B for sample interview questions 
Given that the public sector has largely been bypassed by foreign entities in planning and 
development processes in Haiti, with no coordination or overarching long-term plan aligning the foreign 
agendas imposed upon localities, it seems viable to take a stance that the state should play an increased 
role in this process. The critical questions to answer were how has the state benefits from these 
technologies and in what ways have these new platforms augmented the capacity of the state to plan for 
resiliency? To do this, aside from taking an inventory of new media platforms and mash-ups introduced 
immediately after the onset of the earthquake, it was necessary to assess which of these have provided 
direct benefits to state departments or organizations. Additionally, of the apps with the most widespread 
impact, how are they faring today? In what way have they been adapted or localized to better suit Haitian 





From analyzing the three case studies, ongoing plans for integrating ICT into planning activities, and 
the legislative framework for innovations and intellectual property rights in Haiti, it is clear that new ICTs 
have the potential to increase adaptive capacities of governing bodies but that there are major limitations 
to this. Thusfar, institutionalization of new ICTs in Haiti has happened only on a surface level. I present 
the following observations: 
o ICTs possess the potential to address citizen needs, create accountability and transparency 
mechanisms, but this very feature also creates barriers to institutionalization due to increased risk 
for participating organizations. State entities might be reluctant to adopt such platforms due to 
fears of accountability and responsibility when capacity to act on certain information is low. 
 
o Modernization of ICTs in governing bodies could also enhance efficiencies in information 
management and enhance communication and information sharing between sectors but this is 
constricted by the maintenance of such platforms, for which local organizations remain dependent 
on foreign entities to operate and modify such systems – these systems become more static by 
default. 
 
o Locally developed platforms have a greater number of offshoot applications and partnerships than 
those developed by foreign organizations. 
 
o Open source software hasn’t resulted in a greater number of local applications due to high 
switching costs and path dependency. 
 
o Scales matter: national level bureaus where infrastructure, resources and technical capacity are 
concentrated have greater uptake capacity in comparison to local levels where there are human 
and material resource deficits. 
 
o Local innovations in ICT are increasingly taking form in mash-ups for social purposes, 
combining multiple forms of social media to reach a broader audience. End-users (i.e. the public) 
have latched on to such modes of communication with decision makers and the humanitarian 
community. 
 
o ICTs do present valid potential to enhance efficiencies  to plan and manage crises but are only 
tools and cannot effectively augment capacity in isolation – capacity building and supply-side 
tactics need to be considered. 
 
o Uptake of varying projects and platforms is also highly dependent on the networks within which 
platforms and developers are functioning; government entities seem more willing to accept 
foreign-derived platforms since they appear to be more hi-tech rather than encouraging local 
idiosyncratic innovations. Also, since this means they receive money, they will be more likely to 
adopt foreign technologies. Existing connections mean more trust and confidence with certain 






o The utility of recent innovations in ICT in Haiti is not in the creation of transformational software 
or platforms but in the adaptations and different applications that stem from already existing 
software 
 
o Haiti is engaged in many international IPR agreements but has outdated legislation on IPR 








Landscape of New Media 
As a preliminary assessment, I conducted a survey of the key players who facilitated the 
introduction of new information and communication technologies into the 2010 Haiti disaster response. 
The utility of these platforms and actors vary, from increasing the efficiency of information management 
to information sharing, and improving communications with disaster affected communities.  
Figure 1.1: Chart of new Infocoms introduced in Haiti after January 2010  [Source: Knight Foundation Report, 2010] 
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Based on my preliminary survey of actors engaged in the leveraging of new information and 
communication technologies, I decided to limit my scope to applications that contribute to the production 
of geospatial information, as this was identified as a critical need for planning in my review of existing 
literature. I have identified three different platforms located in the private, public, and civil society sectors 
to detail in the following section: Noula, OpenStreetmap (OSM), and SIS-KLOR. The following chart 
provides a brief overview of the characteristics of each: 
 Private: Noula Civil: OSM Public: SIS-KLOR 
Open-source?  X  
Crowd-source? X X  
SMS-based? X  X 
Internet required?  X  
Public Information X X  
Figure 1.2: Characteristic and Case Study selection table 
Access to Infocom Technology  
General Population 
Aside from scarcities of material and immaterial resources, place-specific idiosyncrasies may 
prevent well-developed technologies and/or platforms from being transferable to industrializing countries. 
I will outline a brief analysis of communication habits in Haiti and how they are transitioning with 
increasing exposure to ICTs and social media such as Facebook and Twitter. This outline should serve as 
context with which to situate the general population’s attitudes towards the infocom platforms I will be 
detailing in my case studies.  
The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies ‘Beneficiary 
Communication Evaluation’ surveyed 10 sites – both in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and 
surrounding communities – which totaled 626 individuals. This study reveals the primary information 
sources amongst the surveyed population which overwhelmingly indicate a preference for face-to-face 




methods amongst the general communities, urban Haitians rely primarily on audio and oral 
communication  to share information. 
“One friend of mine went away for two weeks; when she came back in the community she 
explained to me as her close friend that she had felt sick and she used the Ministry of Public 
Health hotline to find information and she went to a cholera treatment centre alone and 
followed the treatment.” 
-Woman camp resident, Port au Prince 
 
 
Fig 2.1: Market shares of the two primary cellular providers in Haiti – cross-referenced with the usership of cellular 
providers amongst the IFRC beneficiaries. [Source: IFRC Beneficiary Communications Evaluation, 2011] 
 
Fig 2.2: Ownership of various forms of media amongst beneficiaries. [Source: IFRC, 2011] 
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Access amongst public planning bodies 
 If located in the capital, Port-au-Prince, public officials will generally have access to Internet and 
computers. However, from conducting interviews “in province” i.e. outside the capital, it is clear that 
public officials generally do not have access to the Internet depending on their level. For instance, 
communal governing bodies (i.e. at the municipal level) do not have access to computers or Internet, and 
will use their phones sparingly on account of expensive voice call and SMS rates. At the regional level, 
public officials do have access to laptop computers, but not internet. In the office I visited, only one staff 
member had an internet key. The regional staff and also use their phones sparingly on account of 
expensive calling and SMS rates; this geographic divide, between urban and rural and different scales of 
governance result in fragmentation and miscommunication between sectors and planning bodies. In one 
interview, a regional planning executive identified cross-sectoral communication as being one of the 
biggest challenges faced by the planning office (Charles, 2012).  
However, within the past year, a new cellular provider, Natcom, has emerged replacing the older 
corrupt version, Telecom. Natcom is a Vietnamese company that is part GOH owned (40%), heavy 
subsidies on call rates and data plans mean that this will be aggressively cutting into market shares 
amongst other cellular providers and stimulating competition. Already this company has started pushing 
for wireless connection keys that can provide internet access based on 3g data networks, meaning you 
don’t need to have a wireless connection. This presents huge opportunities for expanding internet access 












To understand the differences between urban and rural access, a map of cellular coverage was overlayed 
with population density from SEDAC, the socioeconomic data and applications center at the Earth 
Institute. The bright red areas show where urban populated areas exist without adequate network 
coverage. The intention of this map was to show the disparity between urban and rural network coverage, 
but the outcome demonstrates there are still densely populated areas without adequate coverage. 
 
Fig 2.4 Urban areas without network Digicel coverage6 
Institutional Framework 
 
The following section is an analysis of current domestic policies, plans, and international 
agreements which affect technological innovation in Haiti. I will first look at the political importance 
placed on modernization of ICTs, the ongoing plans to promote the advancement of the ICT sector, and 
the intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes to illustrate the institutional environment within which the 
                                            
6 This is in juxtaposition to a press release from President Martelly that claims that Haiti has a 90% network coverage. It should 
be noted that although the map above only depicts Digicel’s network, one of 3 major competitors, it is unlikely that the others 




modernization of ICTs is occurring. Ultimately, this section attempts to understand whether domestic 
technological innovation is being encouraged or whether existing foreign technologies are being used to 
modernize communications and information management within the state. 
 
Political Agenda 
Increasing public awareness of the rapidity of technological change and the slow pace at which 
the Haitian government has reacted and adapted to such change has led the prioritization of this sector on 
the national agenda. In an address by the President of Haiti in February 2011, Michel Martelly 
emphasized the importance of technological advancement as an underlyer of economic development. To 
promote this, he outlined three primary axes of intervention: 
“  1- The modernization of the state through the introduction of technological tools making the management of the state 
more effective and more efficient, while improving the quality of public services to citizens. 
2- The creation of jobs and businesses in the ICT sector by encouraging local and foreign investments in order to 
diversify the economy and to stimulate innovation, particularly among young people, who constitute the majority of the 
population and represent the future of the country. 
3- The modernization of the business environment and infrastructure, necessary for the emergence and the development 
of a true information society.  ”    (Haiti Libre, 2011). 
Although Martelly called out the importance of creating innovative enterprises in the ICT sector, 
no direct actions to achieve this were mentioned. Additionally, Martelly has not recognized the need for 
updating the current regulatory framework within which innovations and technologies must prosper. A 
review of periodicals relating to the technology in Haiti indicate a number of new domestic innovations 
that were designed with a rich understanding of the institutional needs in Haiti but that are constrained by 
outdated legislation. One example is a project designed by a team of students at the Ecole Superieure 
d’Infotronique d’Haiti (ESIH) who developed a program that encrypts and secures messages transmitted 
electronically, which will significantly improve communications between law firms, notaries, the 




of documents for the general population (Haiti Libre, 2011). However, the article mentions the 
infeasibility of this project due to legislative challenges such as lack of legal recognition of electronic 
signatures and absence of regulation for electronic commerce, indicating a failure of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) regimes that promote the uptake of such innovations.  
 
Current ICT Policy  
In 2005, a ‘Bureau Haitien du Droit d’Auteur’ (BHDA) was established to protect intellectual 
works, the rights of authors and the enforcement copyright laws. A decree was written simultaneously to 
coincide with this new body of copyright enforcement. Although this was an advancement towards 
increasing intellectual property protections, there was little reference to electronic intellectual property, 
with only two short subsets of one article addressing the matter - see appendix A for translated articles 
(World Intellectual Property Organization, 2010).  New forms of property and capital require complex 
protection legislation which is not well formulated in this decree. Current policy is outdated and the 
regulatory framework to accompany technological advancement is weak. Until recently, the last 
regulatory text in relation to telecommunications was passed in 1977.   
Against this backdrop, five laws regarding telecommunications, electronic signatures, electronic 
exchanges, and e-governance have been drafted and are waiting for ratification from the Prime Minister 
before it can be submitted to the parliament (Haiti Libre, 2011). However, this branch of the government 
has been unstable since the election of Martelly in 2010. The absence of such regulatory framework 
prevents the genuine uptake of ICT which poses massive barriers to the modernization of business and 
state functions.  
Plans for promoting ICT uptake 
The International Development Bank (IDB) launched two programs in 2011/2010 promoting new 
information and communication technologies to support institutional capacity building in the Government 




sharing to promote “collaboration among all governmental entities and other participating partners, 
thereby establishing the conditions to strengthen GOH’s institutional capacity in the long term” 
(International Development Bank, 2010). Such program calls for the establishment of an ICT task force 
‘Groupe de Travail sur les Technologies de l’Information et de la Communication’ (GTIC) under the 
Prime Minister to identify and support training programs for capacity building. The program also calls for 
the establishment of the Haiti Integrated Government Platform (HIGP) open technology platform to 
provide capacity to host ‘government information systems and databases, promoting efficiency, 
effectiveness and transparency and creating institutional capacity in the Haitian public sector’ 
(International Development Bank, 2010). The budget for the project is $3,700,000 over a 24-month 
disbursement period, which is divided between IDB and Microsoft.  
The plan calls for advancements in ICTs utilized by the GOH, but innovation is never mentioned 
as a strategy for advancement. A procurement strategy is described, however, the strategy dictates that 
Haiti award the contract for the development of the platform’s architecture to a Microsoft appointed 
partner, Infusion. Microsoft has also donated licenses, so the Government is limited to a set list of 
providers (provided by Microsoft) that are compatible with these license agreements. Additionally, 
though the platform might achieve efficiencies in information management, the goal of improving 
communication of such information to citizens assumes that the majority of the population has secure 
access to Internet. Even if this assumption was correct, there is no feedback mechanism in place for which 
to generate feedback or input, thus resulting in only one-way streams of communication. There is no 
mention of utilizing capacities that already exist in Haiti in the private sector to build the platform for the 
state. A procurement strategy directed towards a domestic set of providers could spur local innovation 
and result in an end-product that is more suitable to the state. Additionally, contracting foreign providers 
and developers will leave the state dependent on international providers without the ability to make minor 
modifications or perform system maintenance independently. Once the terms of the grant are over (a mere 





Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
An understanding of the regulatory environments of iboth nternational and domestic of IPRs is 
critical to assess whether innovation in Haiti is being encouraged or discouraged. I will build off Chen 
and Puttitanum’s (2005) theory that there exists a trade-off between the imitation of foreign technologies 
and domestic innovation: 
The foreign firm has a patented technology that allows it to produce a product of a higher quality 
than can be produced by the domestic firm. However, the domestic firm can raise its product 
quality by imitating the northern technology, and its ability to do so depends on the level of IPRs 
in this country. The local sector consists of two firms, one of which has the ability to develop a 
patentable new technology that improves the product quality, while the other local firm can 
imitate the new technology. Increased protection of IPRs makes imitation in both sectors more 
difficult, which has different effects on the country’s welfare. In the import sector, less imitation 
means lower product quality of the domestic firm and thus less competition for and higher price 
of the foreign firm…In the local sector, less imitation means more incentive for the domestic 
innovating firm to invest in a higher-quality technology (more innovation), which leads to more 
efficient investment and to a higher social surplus.  
 
Chen and Puttitanum argue that domestic innovation increases with enforcement of IPR, and 
enforcement of IPRs increase as economic development advances.  However, strong international IPR 
regimes coupled with weak local IPR regimes will result in lower-quality goods and less innovation at the 
local level, and higher-quality goods and more innovation at the international level (Chen & Puttitanum, 
2005). 
Archival research on IPR policy in Haiti has shown that domestic IPR protection is relatively 
weak compared with its high protection of international IPR (represented by its membership in 
international IP-related treaties). This perpetuates high prices of foreign technologies and reduces 
incentives for domestic firms to innovate; for example, the last text written on IP-related legislation dates 
from 1985.  One article in the  ‘Criminal Code of Haiti’ [see Appendix A] constitutes the penal 
framework for any counterfeiting of goods that infringes “intellectual property rights” (World Intellectual 
Property Organization), or “property of authors”. However, there is no outright definition of intellectual 




are “printed or engraved”, it is debatable whether this can even be considered intellectual property.7 
Despite the lack of recognition or enforcement of IPRs domestically, Haiti is engaged in 6 international 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) administered treaties, 29 multilateral IP-related treaties, 
and 2 IP regional treaties [See Appendix for a complete list] (World Intellectual Property Organization). 
Memberships in so many international agreements constrict the ability of local firms to reverse engineer 
or imitate higher quality technologies available internationally, resulting in less competition for foreign 
firms and higher prices, and lagging local innovations. 
Patents 
In absence of nation-wide data available on innovation, I will use patents to illustrate the level of 
innovation occurring in Haiti. The number of patent applications will be used as an indicator for 
representing the number of innovations over the past decade in Haiti. The below graphs are meant to 
compare the levels of innovation in Haiti with those of neighboring countries in similar stages of 
economic development  (Fig 3.1). 
 
                                            
7 Intellectual property is commonly understood as “all non-material or intangible resources” Maskus, K. E. (2000). Intellectual 
Property Rights in the Global Economy. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. to the extent that they “bear 
recognized ownership”Granstrand, O. (2000). The shift towards intellectual capitalism - the role of infocom technologies. 



















Fig 3.1 Graph of patent applications per year in varying Caribbean countries8[Source: US Patent and Trademark 
Office Patent Technology Monitoring Team (PTMT)]. 
 
 
Fig 3.2 Graph of total patent applications and number of domestic IP related decrees per Caribbean country9 [Source: 




Fig 3.3 Chart of the aggregate number of patent applications in varying Caribbean countries10 with available data, in 
relation to the number of WIPO, U N, and WTO IP-related treaties per country [Source: US Patent and Trademark 
Office; WIPO]. 
                                            
8 There is no data available on patent applications in Haiti from the Ministry responsible for such applications, the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry. 
9 There is no data available on patent applications in Haiti from the Ministry responsible for such applications,  the Ministry of 
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 The above chart (Figure 2.1) indicates that Haiti is lagging behind in terms of patent applications 
compared to competing neighboring countries in its geographic region with only 2 patent applications 
from 1998-2011, although prior to 1998 there were 13 patent applications. Additionally, Figure 3.2 shows 
that with the exception of the Bahamas, there seems to be a correlation between the number of domestic 
IP-related decrees or policies and the number of patent applications. Figure 2.3 portrays the relationship 
between each country’s memberships in international IP-related agreements and patent applications, 
which shows a more negative correlated relationship than patent applications to domestic IP policies. To 
further explore this relationship, I compared the number of international treaty memberships (exogenous 
IPR protections) in Haiti to the aggregate number of patent applications as indicators of innovation.  
  
Fig 3.4 Impact of International IPR agreements on innovation in Haiti over time [Source: US Patent and Trademark 
 
This comparison demonstrates that there is a positive relationship between the number of treaty 
memberships and number of patent applications. However, this does not demonstrate causality. To better 
understand the economic settings in each country and whether the level of economic development has an 
impact on either indicator, I compared the relationship between the current GDP of each country to its 
number of patent applications and treaty memberships. 
                                                                                                                                             
10 The countries displayed were selected based on availability of data, these are not representative of all countries in the 
Caribbean. 


























Fig 3.5 Impact of economic development on both innovation and international IP agreements [Source: US Patent and 
Trademark 
 
Based on this rudimentary analysis, it appears that membership in international treaties has a 
more prominent correlation with number of patent applications (r! = .746) than economic development 
does (r! =.726). Additionally, there seems to be a less significant correlation between economic 
development and treaty memberships. This is indicative of the aforementioned relationship. However, 
Chen’s text asserts that there is a critical juncture in economic development at which states will start 
enforcing stronger IPRs to promote domestic innovation. However, before this juncture it is advantageous 
to not enforce such protections to allow more imitation of foreign technologies.  
This poses obstacles for modernization of businesses and state entities since there are no 
protections or security. Additionally, lack of intellectual property protections reduce incentive for 
domestic enterprises to innovate, since capital costs needed to invest in research and development are 
increasingly high (due to international regulations), yet the absence of domestic IPRs make imitation by 
competing domestic firms possible. Essentially resulting in a system where risk to innovate is high and 
opportunity to secure profit is minimal, thusly there is no incentive for domestic innovation.   
My case studies will now examine different applications of ICTs and their efficacy of enhancing 
capacity of the state, here I will attempt to illustrate that domestic innovations have more utility as they 
R! = 0.72607 
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are more appropriate and scalable than foreign innovations.  This will be critical to understand how to 
encourage more ‘suitable’ and ‘appropriate’ innovations in ICT in Haiti. 
 
Case 1: Ushahidi Haiti Project and Noula 
Ushahidi Haiti 
 
Fig 4.1: Ownership of various forms of media amongst beneficiaries. [Source: IFRC, 2011] 
 
A group at Tufts University Fletcher initiated the Ushahidi-Haiti Project (UHP) immediately following 
the January 12, 2010 event. The goal was “ to involve the citizens of Haiti in their own reconstruction by 
providing information and ways for local voices to be heard”. The platform was live in a couple of days 
after the event. UHP was plugged into the larger Mission 4636, a collaborative initiative involving 
numerous humanitarian emergency responders such as the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC), 
Internews, InSTEDD, Digicel, the State Department, etc. to coordinate and provide citizen engagements 




disaster affected communities to critical humanitarian responders. However, although the Ushahidi team 
employed members of the Diaspora, there was no call center set up so messages could only be received 
via SMS, a major barrier to access given the low literacy rates and preference for person-to-person 
interaction in Haiti.  
 
 
Fig 4.2 Noula.ht Interface  
Noula 
Noula is a not-for profit foundation that was founded by Solutions S.A., a private Haitian software 
development company. The Noula platform is similar in concept and implementation to that of Ushahidi 
Haiti, the use of crowdsourcing technologies to collect information from communities, plot out the 
incident on a global database/map, and relay the actionable information to an appropriate responder. 
Noula incorporates information received from various forms of media: to date 28,347 messages 
(including SMS messages and email) and 29,637 voice calls. The platform as a manager of the 




skepticism from the humanitarian community, suspicious of a private sector firm working in the 
humanitarian sphere. The concept of the platform is similar to that of Ushahidi Haiti, however the 
software was developed exclusively by Haitian developers affiliated with Solutions S.A.    
Adaptation 
 
UHP sent representatives down as soon as 10-days after the earthquake to assess the situation on the 
ground and to begin forming partnerships amongst humanitarian responders. The engagement between 
UHP and SOLUTIONS S.A. began informally in mid-February 2010 and more formally in April. UHP 
assisted with the planning and the design of the Noula platform but retained a strictly advisory role, 
meaning SOLUTIONS made all the decisions. In March 2010, Ushahidi offered Solutions the option to 
accept the Ushahidi platform but Noula ultimately chose to continue building up their own platform. The 
Ushahidi Haiti platform continued receiving messages via the 4636 short code11 (formerly a weather 
reporting channel that was donated by Digicel) until June 2010.  At this time, all technology infrastructure 
was in place on the Noula side and the new short code, 177, was deployed which routed all information to 
the Noula platform. UHP continued providing assistance to Noula in an advisory capacity until May 
2010. This took place on three levels:  
1. Technical Support – providing assistance to SOLUTIONS developers and speeding up the 
process. 
                                            
11 Short codes are special telephone numbers, shorter than regular numbers, used to direct SMS messages from cellular devices, 
i.e. 177 and 4636, both provided by Digicel. Arrangements for short codes are made with cellular providers and negotiations 





2. Work force development – assisting with the human resource aspect of operating the Noula 
platform, this includes planning for how many staff members are needed as well as strategic 
thinking. 
3. Networking – introducing and promoting Noula to the humanitarian community which was 
unaware of the local system for communicating and assessing community need, helping Noula to 
understand the log base issues and security settings (Valuch, 2012). 
In August 2010 Ushahidi withdrew support and transferred the remainder of their funding to the Noula 
platform (about $4000) to purchase headsets, equipment, etc. Funding was also granted to a local radio 
station based in Cite Soleil, Radio Boucman. There was no support given after this time as Noula had 
been already been plugged in to the humanitarian network.  
 
Fig 4.3: Image of developer team working in the weeks following the earthquake, clearly in scarce conditions [Source: 
Jean-Charles, K;  2010] 
 
Noula’s rejection of the Ushahidi platform is a significant point, an indicator that this platform 




to Kurt Jean-Charles - the Noula founder - Solutions staff attempted to work with the Ushahidi platform 
(which uses .php scripting language) to adapt the platform to their vision and needs but in the end 
determined that developing their own platform from scratch would be less complicated more efficient 
(Jean-Charles, 2012). A Ushahidi representative posits the rejection of Ushahidi to programming 
language issues, Noula programmers and developers were familiar with Microsoft coding language (.net), 
a proprietary software, while unfamiliar with .php language used by Ushahidi’s softare, a general server-
side scripting language used to develop dynamic web pages (Baker, 2012).  
Innovation and Evolution 
The Noula platform was created after the founder and his team realized a need to gather critical 
information about emergency services to coordinate efforts amongst disorganized humanitarian 
organizations. Asides from radio stations, there were few responders who could listen to victims or collect 
information on damage and conditions on the ground. Since radio – although the primary source of 
information and communication for many of the disaster affected communities - could not effectively 
record such information, the idea emerged to develop a web page to amass information on community 
needs. The utility would be derived by gathering critical information and displaying this on a publicly 
available web page accessible to various emergency responders to act upon or fill with their own unique 
knowledge and information, assisting with coordination efforts (Jean-Charles, 2012).  
Essentially, there was an identified problem for which there was no existing solution in place in 
Haiti. This all happened in the immediate weeks following the January 2010 event, the call center was up 
and running before Solutions S.A. had met Ushahidi. Although, one employee (intern) of Solutions had 
previously worked for Sahana, a similar open source software that provides emergency responders with 
critical information. In this sense, although it seems that international technology provided a source of 




existing local solution. One can speculate or hypothesize as to whether the Noula platform was a direct 
derivation or imitation of the international Ushahidi software, but from the initial problem identification 
down to the different software’s employed by both organizations, it seems more likely that Noula was less 
and imitation and more a domestic innovation. 





Ushahidi and Sahana existed 
but were impractical 
Locally developed solution to problems 






Solution but not suitable? No solutions? 
Fig 4.4: Scarcity induced innovations (SII) Matrix to determine the nature of the innovation (Srinivas & Sutz, 2008) 
 
Unique features? 
The Noula platform departs from Ushahidi’s model in many aspects of the execution: 
1. Categorization: The Noula platform differs from Ushahidi in the it’s categorization of events, the 
Noula platform incorporated more long-term needs such as ‘Employment and Socio-economic 
Assistance’ where as the Ushahidi platform was looking more specifically at crisis events. In 
another observation, Noula has fewer variations in categorization than Ushahidi, who’s categories 
were constantly broadening. 
2. Call center: The call center enabled Noula to create direct linkages between the disaster affected 
community in Port au Prince and the humanitarian response, most likely one of the main reasons 
why Ushahidi wasn’t as successful as Noula. The operators are Solutions S.A. staff and speak 
Kreyol.12 
                                            
12 According to an IFRC Beneficiary Communications Evalution, 85% of Red Cross beneficiaries surveyed were happy with 




3. Applications: Several applications were developed that build off the Noula call center, developed 
by Solutions in tandem with clients: 16-613, Radio Tap Tap14, Chimen Lakay, private call centers, 
etc. These applications are customizable and developed by Solutions S.A. staff. 
 Ushahidi Both Noula 
Characteristics/Features - Strictly SMS based 
- Relied on outsourced 
volunteers 
- Born out of 
international civil 
society 
- Open-source software 
- Mapping of crisis 
events 
- Information made 
public 
- Crowd-sourcing of 
information 
- Both SMS, voice-call, 
and web based 
- Operated by local paid 
professionals 
- Developped using 
proprietary software 
- Developed various 
applications for other 
clients 
Fig 4.5: Chart of similar characteristics and differences between Noula and Ushahidi 
 
Ushahidi platform 
 USHAHIDI NOULA 
Open-source? X  
Crowd-source? X X 
SMS-based? X X 
Internet required?   
Public Information X X 
Fig 4.6: Chart of similar characteristics and differences between Noula and Ushahidi 
                                            
13 16-6 is a Red Cross and IOM project initiated with Noula and the Government of Haiti (GOH) to provide information about a 
family relocation programs in the IDP camps, the goal is to try to resituate tent camp residents to more permanent housing. 
Beneficiaries can call the hotline to apply for the program and to receive more invormation. 
14 Radio Tap Tap is a program developed by a local journalist in conjunction with Noula, the radio program is recorded on dvd’s 
and is distributed to informal transportation vehicles which comprise the “public” transportation in Haiti. The radio program 






Fig 4.7: Graph of number of total messages received by each platform over the course of the project lifecycle. The 
Ushahidi platform was short-lived and had exited by July 2010 while the Noula platform saw fairly sharp spikes in 
usership with a gradual decline in messages, this could be a result of fewer emergencies or crises or it could signify a 
frustration with a lack of response or the dying a fade. [Source: Ushahidi-haiti.org, noula.ht;  2012]. 
 
As observed in Figure 4.4, the platform was successful in generating feedback and participation 
from various communities. The platform wasn’t advertised but the number was spread via word of mouth. 
Interest peaked during the first 4 months that the platform was operational and has declined since then 
with a few spikes  (perhaps indicating a disaster event, i.e. Cholera outbreak in August 2010). This might 
be attributed to the fact that there was a high demand for interaction and communication with public and 
civil society responders – but because of the lack of actionable responses that resulted from use of this 
service, interest in the platform has steadily declined. This is an indicator that if this platform were 
successfully institutionalized to the point where information was consistently acted upon, it could be 
widely utilized by the population. 
Adoption by State Agencies 
 
The initial intention of Solutions S.A. was to build up a platform that could function as a 
community needs assessment tool and also as a regulator to monitor different humanitarian organizations 

























































































































developed, the platform could then be handed to the state for management, the hope being that the 
platform would help to enhance the capacity of the public sector (Jean-Charles, 2012). Members of both 
Noula and Ushahidi were actually contacted by a public liaison responsible for the management of 
strategic information in the aftermath of the earthquake, to develop a system that could be of use to the 
Haitian Department de la Protection Civile (DPC) - the unit responsible for disaster risk reduction funded 
by United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The representative was interested in creating a 
standard system for registering displaced people – one of the OCHA15 goals – as well as for promoting 
“effective tools to alleviate the crisis and the suffering in the aftermath of the quake” (Jean-Jumeau, 
personal correspondence, February 4, 2010). According to the founder of Noula, the public liaison offered 
valuable input on what would be critical for the state’s use and offered information on how best to lobby 
with governmental entities(Jean-Charles, 2012). Thus the platform appears to have been developed in 
tandem with input from public sector representatives. 
Although there was strong will from actors on both sides of the platform, this hand-off was never 
successfully completed.  The initial assumption that the platform could enhance the capacity of the public 
sector was found to be problematic since, as the developers learned, the ‘state’ is not a consolidated body 
but rather consists of various uncoordinated entities (Jean-Charles, 2012). The firm had to make the 
decision whether or not to proceed with donating the platform to the DPC, which would have granted 
them the opportunity to show humanitarian responders and international aid organizations that they have 
resources and capacity to make an impact. However, doubts about the state’s capacity to manage or 
maintain the platform prevented Solutions S.A. from handing it over, for fear that the platform would fade 
out within a few weeks or months and would cease to be a resource for the community (Jean-Charles, 
2012). The firm eventually retained the platform to ensure its longevity and financial sustainability.  
                                            
15 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is a department of the UN responsible for “ensuring a 
coherent response to emergencies”, their first listed goal is to “Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian 
action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies”. 




Thus, the failure of the transition of the Noula platform from the private to public sector occurred 
on two levels: 1) the state, which was reluctant to assume responsibility, and 2) the firm, which lacked 
confidence in state institutions to maintain the platform. One member of the Ushahidi field team posits 
the rejection of the platform to the state’s fear of responsibility (Carlson, 2012). Since flows of 
information about citizen need make governmental agencies (and traditional humanitarian responders) 
accountable – there is a certain risk involved when taking on this responsibility. According to the public 
information liaison, a formal engagement with Noula would add another item to an already overwhelmed 
agenda/system (Jean-Jumeau, 2012). Governmental entities do not have the human resources or the 
capacity to adequately respond to community needs. Therefore there is hesitancy to engage in a platform 
that would make them responsible. To directly quote the Ushahidi representative, “if the tool is too sharp, 
you don’t want to hold it.”(Carlson, 2012). Additionally, it is not within the culture of the Government of 
Haiti to respond to citizen need. With such weak capacity, there is little room to respond; this coupled 
with issues of corruption could have contributed to the failure of the system transfer. 
This is not to say that there haven’t been successful short-term engagements with the state; during 
Carnival, the justice department, police and office for public security partnered with Noula to provide 
24/7 coverage of the festival. In the perspective of the Noula founder, this was a more successful 
engagement and successfully saved a life, the success of this program has led to more permanent 
discussions about monitoring for mental illness in the city as well as kidnapping prevention. Charles 
attributes the success of such a program to have been a direct result of personal engagement and 
commitment, regardless of the small budgets. 
Despite ensuing discussions and collaborations with state entities, a realization that the call center 
couldn’t function in isolation - meaning it does not have significance or relevance on its own - led the 
founder to forge partnerships with a growing list of responders. Since at the moment, the primary 






Adoption by Humanitarian Responders 
Red Cross and IOM are large international organizations that have created private applications 
with Noula. According to Ushahidi representatives, the Red Cross represents an idealized model of Noula 
information usage (Carlson, 2012). Red Cross set up a private call center through Noula to open 
communication streams with its beneficiaries in IDP camps by calling 177, this functions primarily as a 
center for receiving and logging complaints within the camps and also provides vital information about 
various relocation programs and services to confused beneficiaries. Overall, this program has been 
successful since its establishment, according to a Red Cross report, about 85% of interviewed 
beneficiaries found the information they received useful and appreciated the service since having a human 
connection “shows respect” for the beneficiaries (Reader, 2012). Beneficiaries are motivated to use this 
service as opposed to consulting with community liaisons who are deployed in the field because there is a 
lack of trust in the community field workers, an assumption that the field worker would provide 
inaccurate information. Additionally, an International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) representative 
expressed that beneficiaries felt more comfortable speaking with an intermediary rather than complaining 
directly with the organization. Noula sends IFRC an excel spreadsheet at the end of each week with call 
data, which one IFRC staff member will review and will expand upon. Solutions S.A. is compensated for 
the services they provide, which is enough to operate off of, this rate is cheaper than employing 2 full-
time staff at Red Cross. 
 Noula Ushahidi 
Humanitarian MINUSTUAH 
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Figure 4.8: List of users and partners for each platform, clearly Noula had engaged more users. This may be 
attributed to the outreach efforts on both Ushahidi and Noula’s end to tap into the traditional humanitarian response to 




because of a lack of understanding about this process and the information systems already in place - my assessment 
details the utility of the Noula platform to each of the listed actors; some found great utility in the service provided by 




The founder of Solutions S.A. recruits most of his programming staff from university programs, 
specifically the computer-engineering program at the University d’Etat Haiti (UEH) Science Department, 
where his spouse is a professor. There is a tight-knit burgeoning tech community in Port au Prince linked 
to academia – such programmers are found to be more willing to share and thus produce more 
innovations – however, much of this human capacity is absorbed by international organizations or large 
international corporations (i.e. Digicel, Comcel, etc.).  The founder has also recruited people from civil 
and electrical engineering programs as well.  In the second phase of Noula, the founder took 
recommendations from employees for other interested personnel whom he would then provide trainings 
for. Additionally, experts in fields such as psychology were invited to provide insights and trainings to 
call operators on how to manage anger, frustration, and to prepare scripts for callers. Although many of 
his programmers have around 10-15 years of experience, he’s found the better programmers to be those 


















































• No 2-way flows of     
  communication
• Not a closed loop system
• No derivations
• No certainty of efficacy
• 8 Foreign Actors
• 0 Local Actors
• 0 state actors
• Not tapped into formal    
humanitarian response
• 3 2-way flows of
  communication
• 2 definitive closed loop
  systems
• 4 derivation applications
• 2 Foreign Actors
• 3 Local Actors
• 2 state actors
• Tapped into formal





Case 2: OpenStreetMap Haiti 
 
 
Fig 5.1: Screen shot of the OSM interface and the Port au Prince map [Source: OpenStreetMap.org]. 
 
OpenStreetMap is an open-source software and crowd-sourced mapping platform for generating 
spatial information, as an answer to Google’s proprietary monopoly on geospatial information. OSM is 
managed by the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT), an international non-governmental 
organization. Immediately after the earthquake, HOT worked to collect geographic information from 
multiple satellite imagery providers such as: NOAA, GeoEye, Google and the World Bank.  Information 
was then input onto an open source online map by crowd-sourced volunteers, generally of the 
international community.16 This was done primarily through remote internet connection using satellite 
imagery provided by major providers as a base. Emergency responders such as IOM and the Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) utilized this information. OSM is published under and 
open license but is attempting to relicense under the Open Database License (ODbL): 
The Open Database License (ODbL) is a license agreement intended to allow users to freely 
share, modify, and use this Database while maintaining this same freedom for others. Many 
                                            





databases are covered by copyright, and therefore this document licenses these rights.(ODC Open 
Database License (ODbL)). 
 
Local Adaptation and Innovation 
The OSM platform itself was not a new innovation amongst the international community, 
however in the context of Haiti, it was a novel technology. The platform has been run jointly for the past 
2 years by HOT and a Haitian non-governmental organization, Comite OpenStreetMap d’Haiti (C-
OSM.HA), which recruits volunteers out of Cite Soleil – again another tight-knit community dedicated to 
absorbing the skills necessary to manage their own software/platform. C-OSM.HA is generally concerned 
with maintaining democratic internal organization and the group is subdivided into technical groups, i.e. 
strategy, developers, etc. However, according to the head of the group, the process has not quite yet been 
regulated as there is a learning curve involved with more technologically advanced projects (Alcin, 2012). 
It became clear after conducting subjective observation during an internal staff meeting that there is a 
strong desire for the Haitian organization to become more independent and assume more responsibility 
rather than continuing to depend on international support from HOT. Yet it is recognized that there is still 
a strong need for technical support and continuation of free resources to maintain the project. 
The hiring of Haitian staff to implement the mapping activities indicates that spatial information 
is being generated with more local knowledge and therefore might be less susceptible to error. All 21 
employees begin as volunteers who undergo trainings on how to use GPS trackers, but then eventually 
can be promoted to full time employees. This has sparked somewhat of a “movement” locally, with over 
300 participating in trainings in Leogane, Jacmel, Gonaives, Cite Soleil and St. Marc (Chavent, 2012). A 
number of former volunteers are now employed by IOM or are full-time staff for C-OSM.HA. Volunteers 
use handheld GPS trackers to geo-reference “humanitarian” points of interest and roads, mapping is 
becoming more mobile with the increasing prevalence of android handsets which can record your geo-
location and can be added to OSM instantly. Anyone can upload data onto the platform but this data is 




inaccurate edits are made. In this sense the platform is becoming more accessible, but androids are still 
unaffordable to a majority of the Haitian population, meaning that crowdsourcing is limited to trained 
members and to the international community. C-OSM.HA still uses OpenStreetMaps universal open 
source software.  
Adoption by the State 
The head of the HOT Haiti team informed me that the platform design was intended to be 
“scalable and adaptable to humanitarian needs both urgent and long-term” (Chavent, 2012). However, 
this neglects the incorporation of the state as a key player in the scaling of such a platform. Although C-
OSM.HA is engaging in scaling-up activities, this is being promoted through large bilateral and 
multilateral aid organizations rather than through public sectors. For example, USAID recently funded a 
3-month long contract to C-OSM.HA / HOT to map a smaller town to the north of Port-au-Prince, St. 
Marc. This project is in the process of being completed. The expansion to outer lying areas of Haiti 
indicate a wider coverage achieved by this platform but this raises the question of how sustainable this 
platform will be if it’s reliant on external funding and assistance to implement such mapping initiatives. 
Another issue that must be taken into consideration is what service OSM provides to the Haitian 
public – is OSM solely a humanitarian service for humanitarian organizations or can Haitians actually use 
OSM. Can it facilitate planning processes or contributing to information sharing between public entities 
and NGOs. Lack of Internet access amongst the general population clearly acts as a major impediment to 
its wide-scale use, moreover, Haitians don’t have a “history” of mapping leading most rely on innate 
knowledge of their surroundings. Interviews with planning professionals in the private and public realm 
indicate that planning agencies don’t generally rely on OpenStreetMap for more than a preliminary 
assessment of a situation. In these opinions, data is usually not accurate or reliable. For accurate 
geospatial data, the national department of geo-spatial information (CNIGS) is called upon. When CNIGS 
doesn’t have the data set needed, the planning agency/organization will conduct their own research or 




base plans or analyses off of, it could offer utility in terms of information sharing and prevention of 
duplication of efforts. However, although some of the organizations interviewed expressed desire to 
upload their data to the OSM platform, the open source software poses issues of interoperability. Most 
organizations collect information in a proprietary software, ArcMap GIS, which allows for more data 
analysis and manipulation but OSM uses slightly different software, Potlatch (2)17. Potlatch is not easily 
convertible to or from GIS shape files. Additionally, OSM is too fundamental to handle complex shape 
files or geo-databases that contain vital information (Stinson, 2012). Once NGOs have collected their 
information and entered it into their own geospatial management software, the act of converting it into 
OSM is often sidelined and often is never completed. Many of the organizations also feel that their work 
is proprietary or confidential so are reluctant to upload it onto a global database. Although one of the 
primary pillars of OpenStreetMap is to make spatial information files accessible to the public to identify 
gaps and overlaps in the system, these impediments prevent OSM from successfully acting as a nation-
wide database of geospatial information. 
C-OSM.HA does provide many trainings, however, this is not done systematically. The HOT 
representative informed me that OSM worked with the local government on training to reinforce the 
capacity and to generate and manage data and risk reduction efforts, the Ministere des Travaux Publics, 
Transports, & Communications (MTPTC) and Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC) were listed as key 
governmental departments in these efforts (Chavent, 2012). But this information remains unverified. For 
instance, during a project in St. Marc, the goal was to train youth which were recruited from local 
schools. According to participants, the local mayor was aware of the ongoings and came to observe one of 
the trainings but neither he nor his staff were included in the trainings. 
 
                                            
17 Potlatch2 is the newest system on OSM, however 18 other editing softwares are available depending on broadband connection 
and processing capabilities, JOSM is the most popular desktop editor which is a Java application. GpsMid, iLOE, Mapzen POI 




 HOT OSM C-OSM.HA 
Open-source? X X 
Crowd-source? X X 
SMS-based?  X 
Internet required? X X 
Public Information X X 




Following the earthquake, the ability for foreign responders to identify and locate areas of intervention 
was problematic in the absence of clearly defined street names or addresses. For this reason, the quick 
implementation and crowd-sourcing of OSM to provide spatial information in Haiti was essential and 
critical, the main benefit being the addressing of streets. However, questions about long-term viability of 
this platform are under scrutiny. The OSM platform has remained generally unchanged with the exception 
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Case 3: WASH 
Fig 6.1: Map generated from SIS-KLÒR water testing data [Source: DINEPA]. 
SIS-KLÒR 
Unicef is the UN department, which during the disaster response period was in charge of the 
cluster that promotes hygiene and clean water and sanitation practices called WASH. The cluster system 
was initiated after the 2005 Sudan emergency and uses a sectoral approach to disaster releif whereby each 
organization or department in the UN is responsible for a certain sector. Since there was no emergency 
response system in place for information management, Unicef created an information management 
system using the 3W matrix (who? what? where?) to coordinate efforts of various responders working in 
disaster relief. This system relied on the NGOs responsible for the camps to submit a report about their 
activities regarding water sanitation and hygiene to prevent overlap. However, this turned out to be 
problematic since few NGOs would submit their reports and those that were submitted were often missing 




database. The processing of such reports consumed about 80% of the cluster’s work and the information 
was ultimately not used (Urruela, 2012). 
After the Cholera outbreak in September 2010, the lack of such a system became increasingly 
evident. The SIS-KLOR information management system was thus developed to manage and monitor 
water and sanitation in IDP camps. The system was designed specifically by the Haiti-based Unicef team 
located at the Logistic Base18 in Port au Prince for internal monitoring; the software itself was developed 
by the PanAmerican Health Organization (PAHO). The system decreased reliance on NGOs for 
information by enlisting a field team of 20 field surveyors to monitor the IDP camps in 11 communes 
based on observation – and sometimes on questioning residents. These indicators included: latrines, hand 
washing facilities, showers, hygiene promotion activities, and water distribution. However, the survey 
utilizes simple “dumb” phones to submit information via SMS, using a code that contains the test results 
for chlorine levels in water sources and the geographic coordinates of the source. In this way, no geo-
referencing is necessary and the data can be automatically translated into excel using the software 
developed by Unicef and PANHO rather than having to be entered manually into excel, which can 
enhance the efficiencies of the state departments (Valentz, 2012). If there were an issue with one of the 
test results, the camp could be alerted immediately. This information is also converted into maps for 
monitoring and evaluation and long-term planning. 
 
 SIS-KLOR Unicef SIS-KLOR DINEPA 
Open-source?   
Crowd-source?   
SMS-based? X X 
Internet required? X X 
Public Information   
Fig 6.2: Chart of similar characteristics and differences between SIS-KLOR under Unicef management and DINEPA 
mangement 
 
                                            
18 The “log-base”, or base logistique, is the central humanitarian organization headquarters where many NGOs and multi lateral 




Direction National d’Eau Potable et d’Assainissement (DINEPA) – WASH 
DINEPA is the national department of potable water and sanitation, which was formed in 2009 under a 
new law restructuring the standing department SNEPA and CAMEPA. Under this law, a regional office 
of potable water and sanitation was created as well as Centres Technique d’Exploitation (CTEs) in each 
town (27 in total). In rural areas with populations of less than 2000, Komites Aprovisyon Do Potable 
Assainment (KAPA) were established to manage water networks.  All employees previously working for 
the former departments maintained their positions under the new direction (Valentz, 2012). 
Adoption by the State 
In August 2011, the SIS-KLOR water monitoring system was expanded to serve local hospitals in 
Port-au-Prince in addition to IDP camps. The national governmental department responsible for potable 
water and sanitation (DINEPA) shared responsibility for the information management of WASH and thus 
was the natural partner and successor of the WASH cluster – i.e. Unicef – and thus was mandated to 
assume responsibilities of the information management system. They underwent a transition period from 
October to December 2011, whereby all leadership and responsibilities were handed over from UNICEF 
to DINEPA. Two workers that were working under UNICEF direction have left and were directly hired 
by DINEPA, both of them Haitian and one of them a trained ArcGIS expert who previously was 
employed at the national center for geospatial information (CNIGS). In January, the balance of power was 
1 team member from UNICEF and 3 members in DINEPA, the total number of team members has slowly 
diminished along with the need since Cholera is now less of a threat. Currently, the Unicef worker is not 
officially a member of the WASH response but still provides assistance in the form of technical support 
and transfer of knowledge and experience (Valentz, 2012). 
This could be in part due to the funding they received from USAID to manage potable water and 
sanitation in the country, which was a priority in Haiti following the Cholera epidemic. In February, the 




outer lying cities. At present, 7 different CTEs19 are using the SIS-KLORR system to send in water test 
results, the other 20 CTEs still use paper-based systems or submit excel sheets. However, out of the 7 
CTEs being tested, only 4 report information regularly while the other 3 never submit information. The 
DINEPA representative posited this to a behavior issue, citing the need to train the CTEs how to use the 
new technologies and promoting the use of the system. However, recognizing that training had already 
been conducted, another obstacle to effective integration was the high cost of sending SMS messages, 
which is funded by the local CTEs rather than the national department, fiscal constraints prevent local 
CTEs from participating (Valentz, 2012). One positive outlook is that the Minister of Education had 
approached DINEPA with the possibility of launching a water monitoring system in the schools in Port au 
Prince, to be launched January 2012. 
 
Innovation and Adaptation 
 
In the case of WASH and SIS-KLORR, the innovation was driven by needs of the humanitarian 
response. Few external or local actors were involved in the innovation process, design or development. 
Initially, WASH was an emergency response system but now that it is being transferred to DINEPA, who 
is more interested in the long-term development of the country, the system may need to be reoriented and 
reengineered into a longer survey from which to launch a longitudinal study. A WASH survey was 
designed to be conducted monthly and to incorporate all 23 indicators based on the National Cholera 
Strategy. Since the initial design of SIS-KLÒR could only measure one indicator – the chlorine levels in 
the water sources – only a few indicators could be derived. However, since the software the platform was 
developed with proprietary software, any additional modifications to the system would need to be 
submitted as a pro-forma back to Unicef and PANHO which would take time to process and then re-
develop. As the DINEPA representative mentioned, this “would be difficult” (Valentz, 2012). 
                                            
19 The 7 cities participating in the pilot are: Petionville, Croix-de-Bouquets,  Jeremie, Jacmel, Miraguan, Petit Goaives, and Cap 
Haitien. 
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Summary of Cases 
 
 Noula OSM WASH 
Proprietary Proprietary Open Source Proprietary 
Government uptake Somewhat – 2 state actors 
First attempt to transfer was 
unsuccessful due to limited 
capacity to respond to 
information requests and 
possibly fear of transparency 
Somewhat – 0 formal state 
actors. DINEPA uses OSM 
spatial information for their 
base maps. Organizers claim 
to conduct trainings with 
local governments but this is 
unverified. 
Yes – 3 state actors   
Transfer was facilitated by 
Unicef, but this was 
accompanied by funding from 
USAID. 
Scalability Yes - There has been uptake 
with a variety of 
humanitarian responders but 
nothing enduring with state 
entities. This is changing as 
dry-run collaborations have 
proved successful and 
effective, future 
collaborations are underway. 
Somewhat- OSM has 
become the default 
GoogleMaps on account of its 
rapid production of geospatial 
information. Future activites 
for mapping rural areas are 
underway but are being 
funded and encouraged by 
large bilateral donors rather 
than through planning 
agencies. 
Somewhat - 4/7 success rate, 
it seems unlikely that this will 
successfully transfer to local 
levels without more resources 
and training. 
Suitability Yes  - Embedded with local 
knowledge of communication 
behaviors, this platform was 
more successful than its 
foreign predecessor, 
Ushahidi. 
Somewhat - It is applicable 
to foreign aid workers but not 
necessary to locals who have 
inate knowledge of their 
surroundings and limited 
internet connectivity. One 
would need a smart phone to 
access the platform mobily. 
No - Only 4/7 local CTE’s 
are reporting information, 
most likely due to SMS costs. 
Additionally, although 
DINEPA would like to create 
a longer-term M&E survey, 
they are limited to 1-2 
indicators. 
Adaptability Yes - Solutions developed 
and manages the software, 
many changes have been 
made over the course of time 
without bureaucratic delays. 
Yes – Since the platform is 
opensource, this means that 
users can freely access source 
code and create derivative 
applications. 
No - The platform is static. 
To make a request to change, 
the organization would have 
to submit a pro-forma. 
Applications Yes – 4 derivatives, the most 
amount of complementary 
applications were developed 
with the Noula platform. 
Yes/No – 0 local derivatives 
Applications were developed 
to OSM global but not Haiti 
specific, these were also not 
locally developed. 
Maybe – 0 derivatives 
Unicef might be applying the 
same software to monitor 
Jedco (a waste management 
company) 
Demand Yes – public, private, CBO’s, 
multilateral orgs 




As one can discern from the above chart, the Noula platform had greater suitability and also had a greater 
amount of derivations that were developed locally. One could extrapolate this to say that locally 
developed platforms are more suitable and will have more derivations than their foreign developed 
counterparts. This makes sense since the group that developed this application (situated in the private 
sector) had the technical skill set to adapt the platform to other uses and also the local connections to 
formulate additional partnerships with other local actors. Noula also had the most 2-way information 
flows, indicating greater participation.  
In terms of government uptake, Noula was not as successful and was initially rejected as an 
information management and emergency response platform by the state department of civil protection 
(DPC). This was largely attributed to a fear of accountability – which implies that capacity of the state 
department to respond to the information was not sufficient enough to make the uptake of such a platform 
feasible. It is worthwhile to note that recent engagements have been more successful since the DPC’s 
agenda has been cleared up mildly, allowing more resources to be dedicated such a system; timing is a 
critical factor in the introduction of such platforms. WASH was more successful since the national 
department of water had successfully taken over management of the platform. This could be a question of 
resources alone, since USAID had granted DINEPA several million to support capacity building efforts, 
this enabled the proper management of this software. However, it failed when attempting to scale this to a 
more local level. In this light, the theory of fear of decentralizing responsibility and power from the 
National level is dispelled since there have been concerted efforts at the national level to transfer the 
platform to a more local scale. This is telling of the capacity and resources at the regional and municipal 
levels; the failure was a perhaps a result of insufficient funds to send SMS messages at the rate required 
for sufficient monitoring of water quality. It could also be due to path dependency, although trainings had 
been conducted, certain regional bureaus didn’t send in the required information (or continued to submit 




cannot be altered by the national department, the platform remains static and is reliant on a foreign entity 
for adaptations or derivations.  
This is where open source software (OSS) could play a role in allowing for more derivations and 
adaptation but the only platform that used OSS, OpenStreetMap (OSM), didn’t have any local 
derivations. This could be a result of an absence of local knowledge embedded in the software. It is likely 
that since the software was developed by an international organization, there is no ability or technical 
knowledge to change such code. C-OSM.HA, the managing organization, remains reliant on HOT, its 
international counterpart, for technical assistance and other international organizations for funding. 
Additionally, there is no formal engagement of state entities with this application – this perhaps is a result 
of the perception that crowdsourced information is not entirely accurate. It remains to be examined 







It should be recognized that while ICTs present valuable opportunities to increase efficacies of 
state operations and to create direct linkages between the citizen and the state, these technologies cannot 
function in isolation. Tangible social and economic benefits to both organizations and end-users alike can 
be provided through increasing transparency, creating accountability and empowering communities with 
a means to reach responding organizations, from which they have traditionally been isolated. 
Communities have responded positively to these platforms and technologies indicating that there is an 
ongoing demand and motivation to use these services. Ironically, it seems to be precisely for these 
reasons that these platforms were never genuinely accepted by the state. Monitoring mechanisms are 
inherent in these platforms, which makes participating actors accountable to the information received; 
deterring many public departments from utilizing or investing in such technologies. This also offers the 
possibility of holding international players accountable and coordinating their disparate efforts. Since 
international organizations have been the primary providers of disaster response and infrastructure 
development for the past few decades, capacity of the public sector to respond to information has been 
diminished and is not yet strong enough for these platforms to be effectively institutionalized. Drawing 
from Gros, as mentioned earlier in my literature review, “Haiti cannot respond adequately, if at all, to any 
natural disaster due to the absence of any organization of the state that can quickly mobilize human and 
technical resources” (Gros, 2011; 149). In this light, a more holistic approach needs to accompany the 
introduction of such technologies into the public sector including capacity building and accumulation of 





Institutionalization of new ICTs 
My research has indicated that new technologies have no significance in isolation. A critical mass 
is needed to support the technologies to grant value to them as tools that can enhance capacities of state 
entities. Based on interviews with parties involved in the utilization of new infocom platforms, it seems 
clear that it is not simply a failure in the state that is preventing such platforms from being 
institutionalized, it is a combination of factors including limited resources, lack of local ownership, and 
path dependency which render foreign technologies unsuitable and maladapted to Haitian use, impeding 
genuine uptake by the state. A more holistic approach will need to be taken to accompany the leveraging 
of these technologies as well as a nuanced understanding of local need, this could encompass building 
upon existing means of communication as well as supporting the local IT sector by bolstering intellectual 
property protection regimes to enhance intellectual capital markets and support innovation.  
This taken into account, the integration of ICTs into planning activities and administrative 
functions could be successful at the national level where resources are concentrated, many administrators 
at this level have the necessary technical capacity and know-how to operate such technologies. At this 
level, the necessary infrastructure is in place to enable their operation. However, a challenge presents 
itself when scaling up and transitioning to micro-levels, such as the regional and municipal scales. 
According to one employee at the regional ministry of planning, “[the idea] is interesting but it probably 
wouldn’t be useful because the population doesn’t know about [these technologies] and the ministries do 
not know how to use them, it’s too complex and expensive” (Charles, 2012). This issue might be easily 
overcome through trainings, however, the same official mentioned that if the nature of the communication 
or demands relayed through these platforms was urgent, then it would not be useful to governmental 
agencies because there is no capacity to respond; “if it could inform the situation, it could help, but not for 
rapid interventions” (Charles, 2012).  
My cases illustrate that technologies must be developed with local knowledge and resource 




staff does not know how to maintain or operate the systems. Platform ‘leaders’ –typically monopolistic 
firms – are usually responsible for pioneering the evolution of such platforms (Economides & 
Katsamakas, 2006). If this leader is exogenous to Haiti, it will not be possible for these platforms to 
evolve as needed to suit long-term planning needs, especially for a platform specifically developed for 
public administrative purposes. If there were a need to modify the platform, to adapt to local 
idiosyncrasies or for example, to reorient indicators towards long-term planning questions, then the 
adaptation would have to be facilitated by the external entity; maintaining dependency on foreign 
organizations for basic operations and creating an added layer of bureaucracy which prevents the 
necessary evolution of technological change. For this reason, foreign technologies are static and don’t 
allow opportunities to modify or evolve. Although large-scale platforms may initially augment 
efficiencies within the state, as they are being provided for no cost and trainings occur simultaneously, in 
the end they will be dependent on foreign bodies for operating cost-intensive information management 
systems (since systems are proprietary, the cost of the system is passed on to the end-user, the state). 
Once the initial donated licenses are expired, the state will be reliant on an expensive platform that will 
require ongoing maintenance and operation from foreign providers and will remain relatively static. 
However, to establish institutionalization of ICTs amongst state entities, necessary capabilities 
need to be in place with which to manage and respond to the information being generated. Otherwise, 
organizations will be averse to adopting certain platforms since it makes the adopting organization 
accountable; there is a fear of failure associated with this as can be demonstrated by the Department of 
Protection Civile’s rejection of Noula. If there is simply information management involved, then there is 
less risk involved and less reluctance to adopt.  As in the case of SIS-KLOR and DINEPA, there is a 
distrust of platforms developed by domestic firms, especially for private sector firms where there is a 
suspicion of rent seeking. States are faced with the choice of receiving free software from a foreign firm 
or paying for products developed by domestic firms. The issue here is that domestic products come with 




along with this, donations; this as we know however, is not a sustainable strategy. Thusly, the adopting 
entity is obliged to adopt the foreign platform due to its already sparse resources. 
Existing plans to invest and implement a comprehensive e-governance platform for information 
sharing and management are well-intentioned and recognize the need for such platforms, however, these 
fail to address the local supply chain. The procurement strategy outlined in such plans are designed, 
planned, and financed by large multilateral organizations whilst the GOH is only responsible for 
execution and management. Additionally, the procurement strategy is being planned in conjunction with a 
monopolistic firm who has donated licenses, this firm has identified a set list of providers for hardware 
and equipment that are compatible with their licenses and the GOH can choose from this list based off of 
a price comparison. This logic seems sound, however, will result in the procurement of foreign providers 
(i.e. from Microsoft’s list) rather than acting as a demand-based tactic to induce domestic innovation and 
production. Also, once this funding reaches its expiration date, 24 months, the GOH will be responsible 
for paying for the operations, maintenance, and replacement of system parts. Operating Microsoft 
software is more expensive than its open source counterparts (in Munich the Mayor saved "4m in one 
year from switching). It is unclear how long the licenses donated by Microsoft will last, but once the 
system is based on Microsoft, switching costs will be too high to switch to another operating system. This 
strategy has largely been employed by international donors who have been focused investment towards 
the development or implementation of existing foreign ICT systems rather than identifying the local talent 
and incentivizing these to produce the needed systems to address the supply-side. 
Although certain platforms are being adopted now at the national level, it becomes uncertain 
whether they will successfully be scaled or reoriented towards long-term planning. It will be interesting to 






To classify innovations in ICT that have emerged in the post-disaster environment, the majority 
have undoubtedly surfaced to meet social ends, which offers valuable opportunity to provide social 
protections. However, to use Courvisanos terminology, although certainly transformative when applied in 
Haiti, in the international context they have been incremental at best (2000). Crisis mapping and SMS-
based technologies are hardly revolutionary and many of the same platforms have been and continue to be 
applied to many different environments without the necessary modifications. Policies are needed to 
encourage the development of local innovations in ICT that are more suitable to resources and capacities 
in Haiti and that are adaptable and dynamic as needs will change from disaster response to long-term 
reconstruction. However, high risk associated with such innovation and outdated legislation continues to 
be an obstacle to this end. 
My analysis indicates that technological change in the ICT sector has been predominately driven 
by the international community due to the institutional and regulatory environment in Haiti. Effectively 
resulting in the application of technologies developed in advanced industrialized economies associated 
with abundancies of inputs, to a post-disaster environment associated with extreme scarcity. As noted by 
Srinivas and Sutz, scarcity environments encourage innovation in processes and products (2005), 
however, there has been little incentive or stimulation of domestic organizations to reverse engineer, 
modify, or adapt these technologies to create more idiosyncratic platforms. Strict international IPR 
regimes increase the investment costs needed for research and development, this coupled with limited 
demand and no protection from domestic theft/imitation disincentivize firms from innovating. This has 
led to platforms that are not necessarily suitable or conducive to uptake, preventing existing platforms 
from being institutionalized. Increased state regulation of these markets and regulatory frameworks is 
needed to create a more conducive environment for local technological developments. The GOH has 
committed to investing in this sector, but rather than investing in hard costs for improving infrastructure, 




Theoretically, OSS seems a valid approach to lowering entry barriers for innovative firms in 
developing countries. Existing software is publically available for zero cost and can easily be modified, 
adapted, and bundled into an application, service, or database which can be made into a public good or 
which can be made excludable to end-users and competing firms to derive profit. However, my research 
has indicated that adoption of these platforms amongst the competitive private sector in Haiti has been 
lagging. This could be due to high switching costs and path dependency, since software developers are 
taught a certain programming language through education and experience, learning a new language is 
time consuming and makes maneuvering software more difficult. Certain OSS also may not offer as wide 
a variety of possible derivations as proprietary software do. However, an adoption of an OSS operating 
system, such as Linux, that would be more widely accessible could result in a standardization of operating 
systems, allowing for increased interoperability and helping to disintegrate vertical information silos 
amongst governmental bureaus. Extending these platforms to international aid organizations could 
introduce accountability mechanisms and promote information sharing. Investigating the limitations of 
OSS for inducing frontier innovation in late-industrializing countries is an important area for further 
research that this study has uncovered. 
Most local innovations in ICT have been the result of combinations or “mash-ups” of existing 
technologies or media that allow the operators to reach broader population groups. These ICTs are 
embedded with a richer understanding of local communication behaviors, for example the preference for 
face-to-face interactions, which could enhance public participation and thus efficiency within the state. In 
general, these innovations have greater potential to be more transformative as they offer the opportunity 
to “redirect the trajectory of economic development” in Haiti (Courvisanos, 2000). My case studies 
indicate that a vibrant tech community is active in Haiti but large international civil society organizations 
(i.e. IOM) or private firms (i.e. Voila) are currently harnessing these skills. This is problematic because 
profits derived from these endeavors are not feeding back into the domestic economy. This latent capacity 




market. Domestic tech firms and individuals can facilitate the development more idiosyncratic 
technologies that are embedded with a local knowledge not implicit in foreign innovations. Take for 
example the document encryption software developed by the student group at ESIH. However, these are 
constrained by outdated legislation that prohibits both innovation and uptake and use. Current practices 
also are reliant on proprietary software, which has higher barriers to entry and deters firms and 
individuals without enough capital to invest in upfront research and design from innovation.  
It would be more efficient and beneficial to identify existing domestic capacity and invest in this 
sector rather than investing directly into technologies developed by foreign contractors that after initial 
pilot periods will prove to be inoperable due to excessive fees and costs associated with ongoing 
maintenance.  
Recommendations: 
Although I have specified that both supply-side and demand-side strategies must be addressed 
when considering the institutionalization of ICTs for planning purposes, the recommendations will be 
mostly be geared towards tapping into domestic capacities already in place (in the vibrant IT and software 
development community) through the creation of environment conducive to local innovation in ICT. In 
this way, Haiti can continue to modernize independently and develop and support its own ICT systems. 
- Open Source platforms – allow local firms to imitate and modify existing technologies and create 
adaptations  
 
One example of this would be the use of OSS, which require switching costs, but allow the 
developer to freely study and modify existing software’s that are licensed under “general public 
license” type agreements. The zero cost of entry lowers costs for both the end-user and the 
competitive firm, which could enable the development of a wider variety of proprietary 
applications. Applications could then be excludable and could be bundled or repackaged for 
profit. The introduction of more open source software’s would enable a more innovative 
environment and create more system interoperability.  Additionally, using open source software 
platform for information management, sharing, and production in the GOH could result in 
savings in the long-term. One municipality in Germany (Munich) has reportedly saved 4 million 





- Creative licensing  
In the absence of legal parameters for protecting intellectual property – and because the 
development and approval of such legislation will undoubtedly take time given the ongoing 
political instability in Haiti – creative licensing opportunities should be explored. In the 
international and technology space, specific organizations offer protection through various 
copyright and patent licenses.  This allows for the building off of additional works while not 
reducing incentive to innovate since the application can still be sold for profit. A commonly used 
open source license is the GNU general public license (GPL) which provides an equal exchange 
for developers and promotes collaboration while still protecting work. Another option is the 
Apache  
Subject to the terms and conditions of this License, each Contributor hereby grants to You a perpetual, 
worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare 
Derivative Works of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute the Work and such 
Derivative Works in Source or Object form.  – Open Source Initiative (OSI) 
 
 
- Updated policy and legislation  
Lack of domestic IPR protections are preventing local firms or organizations from developing 
new producs since these can be imitated by competitor firms without repercussion. Outdated 
legislation is also preventing uptake of ICT modernization in both the private and public sector 
because information can be a form of intellectual capital, and it is not protected in electronic form 
under current legislation.  
 
- Procurement that draws on domestic firms rather than international  
Creating effective demand through a procurement process where the bids are awarded to        
domestic providers would be one method for bolstering local innovation. Rather than seeking out 
foreign firms for providing goods and services necessary to implement an e-governance platform, 
the national government could seek out existing local talents to develop the platform.  
 
- Investment in institutions of higher education  
Drawing from Camara and Fonseca’s emphasis on the facilitation of “low-high” innovations 
through public expenditure and investment in human resources, it can be advocated that investing 
in institutions of higher education could promote the development of technologies that are not 
easy to imitate or replicate through reverse-engineering but that have high value. Since these 
innovations typically take place through connections and collaboration amongst academic or 
software engineer networks (take Noula for example, as a private software firm connected to 
academic circles via his spouse), investment in these institutions could enhance human resources 
and capacity as well as promote academic collaborations.  
 
 
These steps call for participation by several actors at work in Haiti, these include National level 




policy) as well as different departments of the state who are capable of developing and enforcing such 
legislation, these departments include the bureau responsible for copyright protection and enforcement, 
the Bureau Haitien du Droit d’Auteur (BHDA), the planning department or Ministere de la Planification 
et de la Cooperation Externe (MPCE), the ministry of public works Ministere de Travaux Publics, 
Transports et Communications (MTPTC), and the Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances. International 
universities with specialized scholars in such subjects could also play a vital role in advocating for and 
informing intellectual property policy; for instance Université du Québec à Montréal’s Departement de 
Management et Technologie which has experts in telecommunications in Haiti. 
This paper also hopes to inform development practice by international ICT platform developers, who 
have introduced m-banking, m-health, ICT4 … etc, into many different emerging economies. While the 
aforementioned platforms have been innovative and have contributed significantly to enhancing certain 
capacities and functions in the interim, more thought should be attributed towards long-term strategies 
beyond training programs. As emerging economies industrialize and modernize (both at the firm and state 
levels), it is important that this modernization occur with resource constraints and local idiosyncrasies in 
mind to ensure institutionalization and uptake by both public and private sectors. 
 The building out of these steps by strategic planners could result in an environment that both 
stimulates innovation and institutionalization, providing a boost to the economic development in Haiti, 
particularly in the ICT sector, while building more suitable and adaptable technologies in parallel. Thus 
allowing technologies to become more scalable as they would be designed with a richer understanding of 
ICT behavior and institutional constraints. While theoretically, these technologies do provide the potential 
to augment efficiency within the state and enable the completion of certain tasks – i.e. manage and 
coordinate information and databases, generate geo-spatial information, and bridge the gap between the 
government and its citizens, etc. - it should be noted they cannot function in isolation. Infrastructure and 
institutional constraints exist that limit the uptake of such technologies and thus should be perceived as 
tools and not solutions. Additionally, before investing directly in the public sector, it would be more 
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Code Penal de Haiti 
Chapter II “Crimes and Misdemeanors against Property” of the Haitian Penal Code. 
Paragraph V “Violations of regulations related to trade and art” 
 
Article 347: Any edition of writings, musical composition, design, lithography, painting and any other 
production, printed or engraved in whole or in part, in defiance of law and regulations relating to the 
property of authors, is a forgery and any forgery is an offense. 
Article 348: The offense of infringing works, the introduction of Haitian territory of books which, after 
being printed in Haiti, have been counterfeited in the stranger, is a misdemeanor of the same species. 
Article 349: The penalty against the infringer, or against the introducer, will be amended at least one 
hundred gourds and four hundred dollars at most, and against the debiting, a fine of at least sixteen gourds 
and gourds at eighty more . Confiscation of the pirated edition will be issued as against the infringer as 
against the introducer and the retailer. The plates, molds or matrices of counterfeit goods, will be 
confiscated. 
Article 350: Any director, any entertainment organizer, artists' association, to be represented, at his 
theater, dramatic works regardless of the laws and regulations relating to the property of authors shall be 
punished by a fine of twenty at least four-gourds, gourds eighty at most, and confiscation of proceeds 
Article 351: In the cases provided by the four preceding Articles, the product or forfeitures revenues 
confiscated, will be given to the owner to compensate all the damage he has suffered: the excess of the 
allowance or the entire compensation, if there has been no sale of goods confiscated, seized or revenue, 
shall be resolved through normal channels. 
 
International IPR Treaties 
Membership in WIPO, UN, and WTO administered treaties: 
• Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks  
• Patent Law Treaty  
• Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (January 11, 1996) 
• Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (November 2, 1983) 
• Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration (September 25, 1966) 
• Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (July 1, 1958) 
Membership in international multi-lateral IP-related treaties: 
• Protocol (III) additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the adoption of an additional distinctive 
emblem  
• WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control  
• International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture  
• Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants  
• Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity  
• Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
(May 8, 2010) 
• Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005 (May 8, 2010) 
• Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (February 9, 2010) 
• Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (December 17, 2009) 
• Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (August 22, 2009) 
• Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (August 22, 2009) 
• Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international 
armed conflicts (June 20, 2007) 
• Protocol (II) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (June 20, 2007) 
• Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (October 4, 2005) 
• International Plant Protection Convention (October 2, 2005) 




• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (December 24, 1996) 
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (August 30, 1996) 
• Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) (January 30, 1996) 
• World Trade Organization (WTO) - Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 
(1994) (January 30, 1996) 
• Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (April 18, 1980) 
• Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (October 11, 1957) 
• Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(October 11, 1957) 
• Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (October 11, 1957) 
• Protocol 1 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention as signed at Geneva on 6 September 1952 concerning the application 
of that Convention to works of stateless persons and refugees (September 16, 1955) 
• Protocol 2 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention as signed at Geneva on 6 September 1952 concerning the application 
of that Convention the works of certain international organizations (September 16, 1955) 
• Universal Copyright Convention of 6 September 1952, with Appendix Declaration relating to Article XVII and Resolution 
concerning Article XI (September 16, 1955) 
• Protocol 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention as signed at Geneva on 6 September 1952 concerning the effective 
date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that Convention (September 1, 1954) 
• Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials (August 14, 1954) 
Membership in regional IP-related treaties: 
• Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific and Artistic Works (August 25, 1953) 







SAMPLE INTERVIEW/SURVEY OUTLINES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Sample Questions: ICT Organizations and cellular providers  
 
1.      What is crowdsourcing? 
2.      What is your process for codifying information? 
3.      How do you prioritize data? 
4.      Do you play a role in coordinating and dispatching emergency responses? 
5.      Does the state play a role in that process? 
6.      What is your relationship with the state? 
7.      How do you think your work fits into the reconstruction effort? 
8.      Do you feel that your technologies engage a wider part of the population than do more simple 
technologies such as radio? 
 
 
Sample Questions: Planning/Development Agencies 
 
1. How has your organization made use of crowd-sourced data via the state? 
2. Have you started your own crowd-sourced initiative to collect data or have you used publicly 
available data? 
3. How have you incorporated this data into your planning process? 
4. Do you share your data? 
5. What is your opinion of crowd-sourced data?  







Sample Questions: Government Agencies 
 
1. How long have you been working for Ministry X? Were you working here before the earthquake? 
2. What is your understanding of crowd-sourced technologies? Do you see this as a useful tool for 
informing your work? Why or why not? 
3. Do you think that crowdsourced data accurately represents your constituents? Do you think that this 
type of data is “authentic”? 
4. Have you ever used or accessed information from Ushahidi or Noula? If not, why? 
5. How has your roles and duties in the Ministry changed since the earthquake? 
6. Have you been required to learn new technologies or software’s during your time in Ministry X, if 
so can you give a list of particular software’s?  
 
 
